



Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie
Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie

Towards a joining of forces in times of crisis

*Investigation into the vulnerabilities and opportunities
within the crisis organisation at regional airports*

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Preface

Since 2012, one of the duties of the Inspectorate of Security and Justice has been to conduct investigations in case of any incidents in the area of civil aviation and civil aviation security. For this reason, its focus over the past few years was on the crisis organisation at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. This time, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice considered it important to shift the focus to the crisis organisation at five regional airports: Rotterdam The Hague Airport, Eindhoven Airport, Maastricht Aachen Airport, Groningen Airport Eelde and Lelystad Airport.

In today's society, security issues and incidents are not limited exclusively to the government domain, but increasingly often cover the field of work of various (semi-)private - and sometimes international - parties as well. Airports are a perfect example of hubs of national and international public and private parties, with their own special dynamics. Incidents at and around an airport directly affect a large number of parties who each have their own interests. Good cooperation between all parties involved is therefore crucial. This requires government parties to implement an approach and strategy that are in line with this, and therefore often requires a broadening of the traditional role played by government parties. The report you are reading shows vulnerabilities in the current set-up of the crisis organisation at the airports, but also opportunities. It is important to join forces in order to efficiently implement the preparations for and actual deployment in case of large-scale and serious incidents. With this report, the Inspectorate hopes to offer tools for this.

Not all organisations involved in this investigation directly fall under the area of supervision of the Ministry of Security and Justice. The Inspectorate is therefore grateful to the surveyed organisations for cooperating in this investigation. This illustrates the professionalism and learning culture within the aviation sector.

J.G. Bos

Head of the Inspectorate of Security and Justice

Summary

1. Introduction

There are relatively few incidents and crises at and around airports. Still, several large-scale and serious incidents have occurred in recent years in which various Dutch crisis control organisations played a role. Airports are international hubs where a large number of passengers and goods depart, transit or arrive every day. The series of national and international networks, the special dynamics between public and private parties and international regulations may cause a decision to have serious direct consequences for various key parties. This is due to the global scale of business that is so characteristic of the aviation sector. This involves interests which are sometimes at odds with each other.

The crisis organisation at an airport must be set up so as to meet the specific dynamics containing public, private, national and international components. This complexity is evidenced by various incidents at civil airports (and the evaluations of these incidents), such as the crash of a Turkish Airlines aircraft in 2009, the bomb threat at Schiphol in 2012 and the alleged hijacking of the aircraft of Spanish air carrier Vueling in 2012.

Earlier investigations conducted by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice focussed on the airport where the complexity of laws and regulations and interests are the most evident: Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. However, part of civil aviation takes place at the regional airports in the Netherlands. Considering the growth of civil aviation at these airports, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice considered it important to obtain clarity at an early stage regarding the challenges the crisis organisations at Rotterdam The Hague Airport, Eindhoven Airport, Maastricht Aachen Airport, Groningen Airport Eelde and Lelystad Airport are facing. For this reason, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice conducted an exploratory investigation, specifically focussing on how the various crisis parties jointly implement crisis control (and preparations for crisis control) in case of large-scale incidents.

2. Formulation of the question

This investigation was based on the following key question: *What is the set-up of the crisis organisation at regional airports and how do relevant parties at the airport cooperate (in case of incidents)?*

The following topics were assessed:

1. The set-up of the crisis organisation

Outline of the parties and bodies that play a role in the crisis organisation.

2. Multi-disciplinary preparation and incidents

Description of the extent to which relevant parties cooperate in the planning process and during exercises.

3. Link between (public-private) crisis organisations and processes

Picture of how the crisis organisations of the airport, the air carrier, the security region, the central government and the Public Prosecution Service are linked.

3. Central conclusion

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice considers the crisis organisation at an airport to be a collection of all relevant crisis parties at the airport who, in case of an incident, have a primary task, responsibility and/or interest in incident control, emergency assistance, any investigation of criminal offences and the aftermath of the incident. For an adequate control of a large-scale and serious incident, it is crucial that officials involved are properly trained and that regular exercises are held.

At all airports, the participants in the crisis organisation are, in principle, aware of the presence of a large number of various crisis parties who have a public or private, and national or international character. So the specific dynamics at an airport is largely acknowledged. An earlier investigation conducted by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice showed that it is this fact that is an important success factor in case of incidents.

During the investigation conducted by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice, it was assessed whether all relevant crisis organisations at airports also cooperate as a single crisis organisation. From that perspective, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice has identified vulnerabilities. These become apparent at the interfaces between the organisations, which may prevent good cooperation that is required during an incident. The vulnerabilities arise at three levels: the link between the regional crisis organisation and the crisis organisation of the air carriers, the cooperation between the crisis organisation and the criminal-law component and the interface between the regional crisis organisation and the central government.

These are generally the result of a lack of knowledge and/or recognition of each other's duties, responsibilities, powers, interests and possibilities. A lack of knowledge and awareness of the crisis organisations of the most important parties involved may, during a large-scale incident, result in confusion, gaps or duplication of activities.


An illustrative example is that the parties who, as a rule, play an important role in case of aviation-related incidents - such as the Royal Marechaussee, the Public Prosecution Service and air carriers - are not always sufficiently involved. This applies to the preparations for incidents, practices and actual deployments. This is an important observation, as a decision made by one of the crisis parties may have serious direct consequences for other relevant parties at the airport and may therefore negatively affect the control and handling of the incident.

In order for the crisis organisation to function as a whole, the possibility of sharing capacity, expertise and resources is still not enough explored. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice considers it important to join forces and involve any external (public and private) parties in both the preparations and the actual control of an incident.

4. Partial conclusions

4.1 Set-up of the crisis organisation

In broad lines, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice investigated which crisis organisations are involved, what the set-up of these organisations is and how these organisations cooperate. For the parties must, as it were, work as a single crisis organisation in order for an airport incident to be controlled and handled efficiently. In case of a large-scale incident at an airport, the crisis organisations of various parties involved will take action, each party having its own role and its own tasks, responsibilities and powers. The crisis organisation at the airport consists of various components: the crisis organisation of the airport itself, the crisis organisation of the security region in accordance with the GRIP system¹, the crisis organisation of the air carriers that are part of the airport company (see the below figure) and the national crisis organisation.



¹ Gecoördineerde Regionale Incident Bestrijdings Procedure or Coordinated Regional Incident Control Procedure.

- The parties involved have set up their own crisis organisation. Laws and regulations apply to this and sectoral supervisors keep a finger on the pulse.
- All public and private parties at the airport have their own statutory tasks, responsibilities and interests in the control and/or handling of an incident. This has been coordinated on various points and written agreements have been made. On a number of points, however, people are unaware of an overlap of the roles and interests of other parties in an incident. An important example is the support, registration and care/follow-up care for victims and their relatives.

4.2 Multi-disciplinary preparation and incidents

A clear description of roles, tasks, responsibilities and the related procedures forms the basis of proper preparations for crisis control. This expressly applies to a more complex environment such as an airport, where national and international public and private organisations are located. Every disaster or crisis has its own dynamics and there will always be unforeseen circumstances which will force the crisis organisation components involved in the incident to improvise. For this reason alone, crisis control cannot be fully captured in plans. For an adequate crisis control, it is therefore crucial that the officials involved and crisis organisation components are well-trained and that regular exercises are held. It concerns both individual and joint preparations, both on a mono-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary basis.

- A regional multi-disciplinary working group focusing on the management and updating of the disaster response plan has been set up for all airports.
- Not all parties who play an important role in incidents at the airport are involved here. The Public Prosecution Service, air carriers and the central government are usually absent and/or do not contribute, so that their processes and interests are sometimes insufficiently taken into account.
- The parties practise their own crisis organisation. The frequency of the overall practise of all components of the crisis organisation is considered by the parties involved to be too low.
- Moreover, exercises are often operational in nature. The parties have an explicit need for practising more complex scenarios, also focussing on administrative dilemmas, apart from operational issues.
- The parties involved believe that the crisis organisation at the airport is well-prepared for smaller incidents. There is less insight and confidence in larger incidents with a more complex scenario.

4.3 Link between (public-private) crisis organisations and processes

A properly functioning crisis organisation in practice is formed by the cooperation between all relevant - public and private - crisis partners. This means that the crisis partners have prepared their own organisation, that there is a clear picture of all crisis partners relevant for the incident and that all these crisis partners are involved in large-scale incidents (and the preparations for these incidents). The complex environment of an airport means that, apart from national obligations, international obligations have to be met as well.

During the investigation conducted by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice, it was assessed whether all relevant crisis organisations at airports cooperate as a single crisis organisation. From that perspective, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice has identified vulnerabilities. The investigation shows vulnerabilities at three levels:

Link between air carrier crisis organisation and regional crisis organisation

- Air carriers are still not always considered a full crisis partner. There is insufficient knowledge of the tasks and responsibilities of an air carrier and the crisis organisation it has set up.
- There is insufficient awareness of the capacity and resources of an air carrier and of the way in which they can be used in the crisis organisation.
- Within the crisis organisation, air carriers are generally not positioned at the level where they can have a say in decisions that concern them directly.
- There is no intensive cooperation and sharing of information between government authorities, airports and air carriers. While the parties focus on the same process, they currently collect information from their own perspective and with their own resources. Facilitating and ensuring information sharing in the area of passenger information and registration is particularly important.

Regional crisis organisation and criminal-law component

- There appears to be a lack of clarity among many of the parties involved about mutual tasks, responsibilities and powers. As a result, there is insufficient awareness that a decision made in one organisation may affect the other organisation. This creates a field of tension between, on the one hand, the crisis organisation under the supervision of the mayor and, on the other hand, the criminal-law component under the supervision of the public prosecutor. Both have their own responsibilities and powers during a crisis or incident.

Link between regional crisis organisation and central government

- There is no robust link between the regional crisis organisation and the central government. During the preparations, insufficient clear agreements were made on the division of tasks in case of aviation-related incidents in which the central government plays a role (for example in a GRIP-Central Government situation). This may, during an actual incident, result in a lack of clarity in the execution and a duplication of activities. Both the central government and the regional parties have been unable to provide each other with any clarity in this respect.
- The central government has various lines of communication from and to the crisis organisation at airports. It concerns, for example, the policy department focusing on security-related matters and the department that has a coordinating role during an actual incident. Moreover, there is insufficient awareness that a decision made by one party may affect the other party.

5. Recommendations

Security issues are not only limited to the police, fire brigade or Regional Medical Assistance Organisation (GHOR) and security region, but also include the field of work of various (semi-)private - sometimes international - parties. In spite of the shared responsibility, the parties often have other interests. Here, it is important for cooperation to go smoothly and for all players to exactly know their tasks, responsibilities and powers. The various interests cause white noise in practice. The operational, public-administrative and commercial interests are sometimes in strong contrast with each other. Cooperation in the crisis organisation does not mean that operational services make their decisions secondary to commercial interests. It is important, however, for parties to be involved in the decision-making process if a decision has serious consequences for other (non-public) parties at the airport. This will

increase the support for the decisions made and the various parties will be able to anticipate major decisions and reduce any impact more quickly. With this in mind, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice makes the following recommendations:

- Provide an overview of the tasks, powers and responsibilities of all possible primary parties involved in the crisis organisation at an airport, paying attention to the role of the Public Prosecution Service, the air carrier and the link between the regional crisis organisation and the central government.
- Ensure correspondence with the images and expectations of the lines of communication and decision-making in a situation in which the central government has a role. This applies to a GRIP-Central Government situation, for example. Clearly discuss the specific situation of an aviation-related incident. Both the central government and the crisis parties at the airport have a responsibility in this.
- The set-up of the crisis organisation at the airport should take into account the obligations of the relevant public and private parties, as well as the possibilities for cooperation by sharing capacity, expertise and resources. This can be done, for example, by ensuring the following:
 - In view of the statutory obligations of government parties and air carriers, it is desirable to make proper agreements as regards the registration of passengers and their relatives and the exchange of information in general. This will ensure transparency and prevent duplication of activities: the parties will not, at various locations, be engaged in retrieving information that is already available.
 - In any case, include, as a standard, the telephone numbers of the Emergency Response Teams of the air carriers in the disaster response plans of the airports (as is the case now at Rotterdam The Hague Airport).
- Invest in and secure the specific knowledge of crisis control at an airport. Include all parties in this (the airports, local and regional parties such as the Royal Marechaussee (KMar), the Public Prosecution Service and municipal authorities, the central government and the air carriers) and practise the crisis organisation on a large scale and on a multi-disciplinary basis. Also practise complex scenarios.
 - Assess whether it is possible to keep officials at an airport for a longer period of time, for example by extending the rotation period of KMar officials at airports to five years.
 - The specific dynamics at the airport and the involvement of many players (with their own powers) ensure that various - administrative - dilemmas are addressed. As few incidents occur in order to gain practical experience, it should be assessed whether working with (national) fixed crisis teams is a solution.
 - The airports included in this investigation struggle with comparable issues and bottlenecks. In order to ensure cooperation between the airports, it is recommended that a multi-disciplinary platform be set up where air carriers and handling agents, airport, security region and the national authorities meet in order to deal with bottlenecks and share best practices. Here, it could be possible to discuss the wish of various parties to draw up a national embassy protocol.

1

Introduction

1.1 Reason

Fortunately, there are relatively few incidents and crises at and around airports. Still, several large-scale and serious incidents have occurred in recent years in which various Dutch crisis control organisations played a role. Airports are international hubs where a large number of passengers and goods depart, transit or arrive every day. The series of national and international networks, the special dynamics between public and private parties and international regulations may cause a decision to have serious direct consequences for various key parties. This is due to the global scale of business that is so characteristic of the aviation sector.

The crisis organisation at an airport must be set up so as to meet the specific dynamics containing public, private, national and international components. This involves interests which are sometimes at odds with each other.

This complexity is evidenced by various incidents at civil airports (and the evaluations of these incidents), such as the crash of a Turkish Airlines aircraft in 2009, the bomb threat at Schiphol in 2012 and the alleged hijacking of the aircraft of Spanish air carrier Vueling in 2012.

Earlier investigations conducted by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice focussed on the airport where the complexity of laws and regulations and interests are the most evident: Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. However, part of civil aviation takes place at the regional airports in the Netherlands. Considering the growth of civil aviation at these airports, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice considers it important to obtain clarity at an early stage regarding the challenges these airports are facing. In order to obtain a clear picture of the set-up of the crisis organisation at these airports, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice conducted an exploratory investigation, specifically focussing on how the various national and international crisis parties jointly implement crisis control in case of large-scale incidents at the relevant airport.

1.2 The investigation

Formulation of the question

This investigation was based on the following key question: *What is the set-up of the crisis organisation at regional airports and how do relevant parties at the airport cooperate (in case of incidents)?*

The crisis organisation at the airport can be regarded as a combination of various (crisis) organisations, both during the preparatory phase and during the incident². All parties involved at the airport have set up their own crisis organisation. Together, they form the crisis organisation at the airport in case of a large-scale and multi-disciplinary incident. For the purpose of effective crisis control, this means that the various crisis organisations must be linked at the organisational level and at the level of the work processes.

The following topics were assessed:

- ***Set-up of the crisis organisation***

Outline of the parties and bodies that play a role in the crisis organisation.

- ***Multi-disciplinary preparation and incidents***

Description of the extent to which relevant parties cooperate in the planning process and during exercises.

- ***Link between (public-private) crisis organisations and processes***

Picture of how the crisis organisations of the airport, the air carrier, the security region, the Public Prosecution Service and the central government are linked.

Definition

The investigation concerns an exploration of the crisis organisation at regional airports. As it concerns an exploratory investigation, compliance by the parties involved in the investigation with the laws and regulations was not assessed in detail. Shortly before the start of the investigation of the Inspectorate of Security and Justice, the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (IL&T) checked the contingency organisations of the airports against international laws and regulations. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice further coordinated its investigation with IL&T and was informed of the results of the audit. Where necessary, this investigation will refer to this in broad lines.

Objects of investigation

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice chose to include five regional airports in the investigation: Rotterdam The Hague Airport (RTHA), Eindhoven Airport (EA), Maastricht Aachen Airport (MAA), Groningen Airport Eelde (GAE) and Lelystad Airport. Meetings were held with the airport authority itself, the municipal authorities, the security region, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), the Public Prosecution Service and the Royal Marechaussee (KMar). Meetings were also held with various air carriers, a handling agent and its interest group.


² With a view to the readability of this document, the choice was made to mix the different terminology used by the various crisis organisations as little as possible. For this reason, the term 'crisis organisation' is used as much as possible.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice also interviewed an organisation that plays an international role in the control (and aftermath) of large-scale incidents and disasters. This organisation does so for a large number of air carriers.

2

Set-up of the crisis organisation

In case of a large-scale incident at an airport, the crisis organisations of various parties involved will take action, each party having its own role and its own tasks, responsibilities and powers. In broad lines, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice investigated which crisis organisations are involved, what the set-up of these organisations is and how these organisations cooperate. The crisis organisation at the airport consists of various components: the crisis organisation of the airport itself, the crisis organisation of the security region in accordance with the GRIP system³, the crisis organisation of the air carriers that are part of the airport company (see the below figure) and the national crisis organisation.



³ Gecoördineerde Regionale Incident Bestrijdings Procedure or Coordinated Regional Incident Control Procedure.

2.1 Airport crisis organisation

An airport has set up a crisis organisation should regular operations be disrupted by an incident. As a result, the crisis organisation primarily ensures the stabilisation and channelling of the incident and the creation of a survivable situation. In order to ensure this, various parts of the crisis organisation are put into operation. The coordinating body, usually called the Committee of Consultation (*Commissie van Overleg, CVO*), is responsible for the coordination of the incident until the crisis organisation of the security region has been scaled up and the CoPI⁴ has arrived. The CVO is chaired by the airport manager on duty. Depending on the type of disruption or calamity, it is decided which other participants are called to the CVO. These could be, for example, representatives of the airport, the Royal Marechaussee, the air carrier or its handling agent⁵, Air Traffic Control The Netherlands (LVNL), Dutch Customs, government emergency response services or other relevant bodies. The executive work is performed by operational units: the airport fire brigade is engaged in the actual incident control, the company emergency response service and other airport personnel are instructed to support and register passengers and/or their relatives.

In accordance with the Security Regions Decree, the CoPI must be put into operation within thirty minutes. The CVO will then act as an action centre of the airport under the direction of the CoPI. The chairman of the CVO will therefore also participate in the CoPI. Apart from the CoPI, the airport is generally also represented in the Regional Operational Team (ROT) and the Municipal Policy Team (GBT) of the regional crisis organisation.

2.2 Regional crisis organisation

If the seriousness and scope of the incident go beyond the responsibility of the airport operator, the security region will scale up the regional crisis organisation in accordance with the GRIP system. This scaling-up system is described in the Security Regions Act.

The scaling up may differ for each region. Depending on the scope and impact of the incident, a multi-disciplinary coordination structure is set up at various levels: at operational, tactical and strategic/administrative level. The GRIP system distinguishes four different stages for scaling up (GRIP 1 to GRIP 4). The emergency response organisation is expanded in each successive stage. Units and officials of the organisation are given specific tasks, powers and responsibilities.

GRIP 1 involves an incident with limited scope. A coordinating body at the site of the incident in which the various emergency response services cooperate on a multi-disciplinary

⁴ CoPI is short for 'Commando Plaats Incident' (Incident Site Command) and is the coordinating body that has operational command of the on-site incident control.

⁵ A handling agent is a company performing groundwork for an air carrier, for example the baggage and freight process. In case of an incident, the handling agent will, on behalf of the air carrier, participate in the CVO until a representative of the air carrier has arrived. Larger air carriers have procedures in place in order to inform the local station (at the relevant regional airport) of what is expected of the handling agent in case of an incident.

basis will suffice. The CoPI is the team that is engaged in controlling the source of the incident at the incident site.

If the scope of the incident is larger and has clear effects on the surrounding area, GRIP 2 will be declared. In that case, the existing CoPI will be supported by a Regional Operational Team. The CoPI and the ROT will assume the operational tasks. Tasks are generally divided such that the CoPI focuses on controlling the primary source of the incident and the ROT focuses on the area affected.

If an incident has a large impact on the residents of a municipality and administrative action is required in this connection, GRIP 3 will be declared. In that case, a municipal policy team will meet. If various municipalities are involved in the incident, GRIP 4 will be declared and a regional policy team will meet.


Municipalities have a statutory duty to take responsibility for parts of the crisis control. If it concerns an airport, the municipality will have a coordinating role in the support, care and follow-up care and registration of passengers and their relatives. Moreover, the municipality is responsible for providing the population with information, to register any losses and to advise the ROT.

Usually, the security region and the airport have drawn up standard alerting protocols describing, for each incident type, how the regional crisis organisation is alerted and scaled up.

2.3 National crisis organisation

In case of an aviation-related incident, the central government will be involved quickly due to the complexity and attention from the media and society. The role of the central government is a broad one. Parts of the relevant departments have a role during the preparations for an incident or large event (or run-up to such event). In case of an actual incident, it may be decided to bring the national crisis structure into effect. Agreements have been made on the GRIP structure. In April 2013, the GRIP 5 and GRIP-Central Government ('GRIP-Rijk') levels were added to the existing GRIP levels. As described in the National Manual on Decision-Making in Crisis Situations (2013), the central government will be involved in case of an intersectoral crisis. This is an incident in which national security is or could be at issue because one or more vital interests are jeopardised and the regular structures and/or resources are insufficient in order to maintain stability. The central government can fulfil three roles here: facilitating (by making expertise and resources available and taking cohesive action), giving direction (by giving urgent advice when coordination and uniformity in leadership and coordination are desired and necessary) and guiding (by giving binding instructions or activating GRIP-Central Government). When the central government has a guiding role and issues a binding instruction, it does not take over the implementation but allows the parties involved to implement the instruction. A GRIP-Central Government may be in effect in various GRIP situations. Guidance by the central government relates to one or more partial aspects of the approach to the crisis and is only offered for the partial aspects on which the intervention is based.

In exercising the power to give (specific) instructions, the central government determines the use of the decentralised powers; this is different from taking over these powers (with the exception of extraordinary circumstances and neglect of duties). In case of an instruction, the administrative responsibility lies with the line minister exercising the power to give instructions. In a GRIP-Central Government situation, the competent authority at national level lies with the legally authorised ministers involved. They coordinate the exercise of their powers in the Ministerial Crisis Control Committee (MCCb). Insofar as the powers of the chairmen of the security regions are, in a GRIP-Central Government situation, not affected by the ministerial powers, the chairmen will continue to have independent authority. The operational responsibility for the approach to the crisis remains with the authorities in the general or functional chain. In case of disasters and crises in the general chain – public order and security in relation to the incident – this will be the mayor or the chairman of the security region. Guidance offered by the central government for partial aspects does not affect the necessary coordination in the Regional Policy Team of the (coordinating) region. Situations may occur in which the central government also assumes the operational responsibility for one or more partial aspects of the approach to the crisis. An example is a large-scale evacuation.



2.4 Air carrier crisis organisation

Under international laws and regulations, air carriers have obligations to their passengers in case of incidents. These obligations follow from the 1999 Montreal Convention, for example. This Convention provides, among other things, that air carriers are liable for damage inflicted on passengers. It concerns events in which passengers die or become injured.

Chapter III, art. 18: 'The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking'.

Each air carrier has its own crisis organisation, which is prepared to specifically focus on the care for passengers and their surviving relatives in case of a large-scale incident: activities in the context of registration, care and support, communication and follow-up care. In practice, this means that there will be overlap with a number of municipal sub-processes (based on the responsibility for population care).

Within this context, air carriers have an Emergency Response Plan, which describes how the Emergency Response Team (ERT) of the air carrier is implemented. The ERT is the core of the air carrier crisis organisation. Its own crisis organisation is initiated in the air carrier's headquarters (or its nearest line station), in order to carry out and coordinate the aforementioned activities.

Depending on the size of the air carrier, the ERT is managed by an Emergency Operations Centre, which is located in the country, city or airport where the air carrier's headquarters are established. Foreign air carriers are situated outside the Netherlands.

Major air carriers almost immediately send Go-teams to the incident in most cases. In doing so, they attempt to fulfil an air carrier's duty of (medical, financial and legal) care for passengers and their surviving relatives. A Go-team includes doctors, nurses, psychologists, legal experts, administrative assistants and call centre staff.

Moreover, most air carriers have concluded a contract with a company specialised in the handling of large-scale incidents. This company carries out the actual activities (or part thereof) in case of a crisis or disaster, anywhere in the world.

A representative of the air carrier usually has a seat in the airport's action centre (the Committee of Consultation) and will therefore be linked to the security region's crisis organisation. The extent to which the air carrier closely cooperates with the airport and the government parties within the context of crisis control varies. This depends on several factors, such as the size of the air carrier and how much experience the air carrier has with preparations for disasters and crises. Another factor is whether an air carrier has a (permanent) representation - and line station - at the relevant airport. For these officials can prepare themselves at the airport on a structural basis.

An example of a company specialised in the handling of major incidents is Kenyon International Emergency Services. A large number of air carriers and handling agents is affiliated with this organisation. This also applies to organisations from other sectors, such as the petrochemical industry, cruise ships, hotel chains and governments. If one of the affiliated organisations is affected by a crisis, Kenyon will scale up its own crisis organisation. Depending on the type of contract concluded, it activates its international call centre, crisis communications team, disaster human services (including a family assistance centre) and a disaster recovery team (fieldwork). In doing so, it can provide air carriers with a full spectrum of crisis control processes: from direct care at the site of the incident to follow-up care in the months and years after the incident. From three head offices in London, Texas and Sydney, Kenyon can be at the site of the incident within 24 hours. For this purpose, it deploys more than 1500 professionals from all over the world. The work focuses on providing the best possible follow-up care for victims and their surviving relatives.

If no representative of the air carrier is present at the airport or if it takes a long time before this representative will be present because he has to come from another city or country, the handling agent will deputise for the air carrier in the crisis organisation(s).

Partial conclusion

- The parties involved have set up their own crisis organisation. There are laws and regulations for this and sectoral supervisors keep a finger on the pulse.
- Each party at the airport has its own tasks, responsibilities and interests in the control and/or handling of an incident. This has been coordinated on several points and written agreements have been made. On a number of points, however, people are unaware of an overlap of the roles and interests of other parties in an incident. An important example is the support, registration and care/follow-up care for victims and their relatives.

3

Multi-disciplinary preparation and incidents

A clear description of roles, tasks, responsibilities and procedures forms the basis of proper preparations for crisis control. This expressly applies to a more complex environment such as an airport, where national and international public and private organisations are located. However, every disaster or crisis has its own dynamics. There will always be unforeseen circumstances which will force the crisis organisation components involved in the incident to improvise. For this reason alone, crisis control cannot be fully captured in plans. For an adequate crisis control, it is therefore crucial that the officials involved and crisis organisation components are also well-trained and that regular exercises are held. It concerns both individual and joint preparations, both on a mono-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary basis.

3.1 Planning process

Article 6.2.1 of the Security Regions Decree provides that the board of a security region, after consultation with the operator of a civil airport⁶, is obliged to adopt a disaster response plan for an aircraft accident at the airfield and in its immediate vicinity at least once every four years.

The investigation shows that such multidisciplinary disaster response plan has been drawn up for all airports. In all cases, a regional multidisciplinary working group, which meets regularly, has been set up for this purpose. Regular participants generally are the security region, the municipal authorities directly involved, the fire brigade, the Royal Marechaussee, the police and the airport involved. The cooperation within these working groups is highly appreciated by all parties involved.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice finds that not all primary parties at an airport form part of these multidisciplinary working groups. For instance, the Public Prosecution Service and

⁶ In accordance with international regulations, the operator must adopt a contingency plan for the airport. The investigation conducted by the IL&T shows that this was done in all cases.

the central government have no seat in these permanent working groups in most cases. In most cases, the air carriers are not involved in the adoption of the plan either.

All parties involved in this investigation struggle with comparable issues and bottlenecks. Preparations for disasters and crises at airports appear to be a specialist matter. There is a need for a national multidisciplinary platform for airports, municipal authorities and security regions, where they can share their knowledge and experience on a regular basis. There was no such platform at the time of the investigation by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice.

3.2 Multi-disciplinary practice

Under Article 6.2.3 of the Security Regions Decree, the board of a security region must ensure that ‘together with the parts of the main structure of the disaster response and crisis control, exercises are held at appropriate intervals, during which the correctness, completeness and suitability of the disaster response plan are checked. In any case, a multidisciplinary staff exercise must be held twice a year and a multidisciplinary exercise involving staff and operational units must be held once every four years.’ The contingency plan of the airport must also be practised during these exercises.

The investigation shows that all parties meet the statutory obligation to hold exercises. However, the parties involved had some concerns. First of all, most of the parties involved believe that the frequency of exercises is too low. There is a need for more frequent, comprehensive exercises. Exercises that only involve separate parts of the crisis organisation (the CVO, CoPI or the ROT) ignore the specific dynamics of an airport incident. According to them, this is a bottleneck because due to the absence of recent large-scale incidents at the airports, deployment experience can only be gained during exercises.

The contents of the exercises are also critically assessed. Various parties involved believe that, in general, the exercises are usually operational in nature and are mostly aimed at the scenario of ‘aviation accident’. Moreover, the crisis organisation at the airport has still only been practised up to level GRIP 3 and/or GRIP 4. The central government is not actually involved in these exercises. There is a need for more frequent practising of other, more broader and more complex scenarios involving various dilemmas (public-private, crisis control and criminal enforcement, at regional and national level), for example a hijacking/hostage scenario, bomb threat or terrorist threat.

A general bottleneck at all airports appears to be retaining experience (with exercises) and airport-specific knowledge. This is mostly due to the high rotation of officials, especially KMar officials. KMar officials are trained to be generalists, have various job focuses and retain the airport job focus for no more than three years at best, before starting a job elsewhere.

Both the airports and the security regions will take measures for this purpose in cooperation with KMar by organising training courses and offering E-learning modules, which is being done at Groningen Airport Eelde. In practice, it appears to be very difficult to maintain the necessary specific

knowledge in the officials.⁷ At at least one of the airports, it was decided, after the Inspectorate of Security and Justice had finished its investigation, to designate fixed teams in order to tackle this problem. The parties involved propose that the airport activities be designated as a speciality and that the related rotation period of KMar officials be extended to five years.

3.3 Incidents

At the five airports included in this investigation, there have been no large-scale incidents over the past years involving a scaling up of the entire crisis organisation. Usually, a large number of smaller incidents occurred which were handled at GRIP 1 level. These were incidents that were included in the plans as a scenario and were practised regularly. In order to gain more learning experience, the deployment in case of small incidents at Groningen Airport Eelde will be evaluated on a structural basis in the Drenthe security region, one of the security regions investigated.

During evaluations of larger incidents at other airports, the parties involved state that they have taken note of the learning points, but do not know - due to a lack of exercises - if the bottlenecks have been solved. All parties involved therefore indicate that they have faith in the functioning of the crisis organisation at the airports in case of smaller incidents. There is less insight into the functioning of the crisis organisation in case of larger and more complex incidents.

Partial conclusion

- A regional multi-disciplinary working group focusing on the management and updating of the disaster response plan has been set up for all airports.
- Not all parties who play an important role in incidents at the airport are involved here. The Public Prosecution Service, air carriers and the central government are usually absent and/or do not contribute, so that their processes and interests are sometimes insufficiently taken into account.
- The parties practise their own crisis organisation. The frequency of the overall practise of all components of the crisis organisation is considered to be too low.
- Moreover, exercises are often operational in nature. The parties have an explicit need for practising more complex scenarios, also focussing on administrative dilemmas, apart from operational issues.
- The parties involved believe that the crisis organisation at the airport is well-prepared for smaller incidents. There is less insight and confidence in larger incidents with a more complex scenario.

⁷ This is in line with the findings of the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (IL&T), which performed audits nationwide in 2014 into the set-up of the crisis organisation up to the level of the CoPI.

4

Link between (public-private) organisations and work processes

A properly functioning crisis organisation in practice is formed by the cooperation between all relevant - public and private - crisis partners. This means that the crisis partners have prepared their own organisation, that there is a clear picture of all crisis partners relevant for the incident and that all these crisis partners are involved in large-scale incidents (and the preparations for these incidents). The complex environment of an airport means that, apart from national obligations, international obligations have to be met as well.

During the investigation conducted by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice, it was assessed whether all relevant crisis organisations at airports cooperate as a single crisis organisation. From that perspective, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice has identified vulnerabilities. These become apparent at the interfaces between the organisations, which may prevent good cooperation that is required during an incident. For instance, some components have a lack of knowledge and/or recognition of each other's tasks, responsibilities and powers. A lack of knowledge and awareness of the crisis organisations of the most important parties involved may, during a large-scale incident, result in confusion or gaps or duplication of activities. The investigation shows that vulnerabilities are found at three levels. These levels are described and specified below.

4.1 Link between air carrier crisis organisation and regional crisis organisation

Security regions have an eye for the complexity of the crisis organisation of the airports investigated. The link between the regional crisis organisation and the airport crisis organisation has therefore been described in all cases. However, especially the government parties are insufficiently aware that in case of a large-scale aircraft incident, the relevant air carrier also initiates a crisis organisation. The investigation shows that the link from the crisis organisation to the air carriers is vulnerable. For instance, air carriers (or a selection thereof) are generally not involved in the planning process and practices. As a result, these players could be forgotten when the pressure is high during an incident.

Limited knowledge of each other's organisation

Both the regional crisis organisation and the airport and air carrier crisis organisations appear to have limited knowledge of the role played by the central government in case of a crisis and the air carrier crisis organisation is insufficiently known in and interwoven with the regional crisis organisation. Air carriers mostly have knowledge of the (crisis) organisation of the airport they fly to. They have less insight into the structure and functioning of the crisis organisation as a whole. There appears to be a lack of clarity especially when it comes to the division of tasks and responsibilities of the public crisis organisations. The Dutch crisis structure is considered to be very complex. Vice versa, the other crisis partners appear to have no or limited knowledge of the set-up of the crisis organisation of these air carriers. The limited knowledge of the central government's role is partly due to the recent introduction of GRIP 5 and GRIP-Central Government and the fact that GRIP-Central Government has not yet been practised. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice emphasises that it is the responsibility of all parties to familiarise themselves with the functioning of the crisis structure in which it could logically and possibly play a role.

Sharing capacity and resources

As described in §2.2.1., each air carrier has its own crisis organisation, which is prepared to specifically focus on the care for passengers and their surviving relatives in case of a large-scale incident: activities in the context of registration, care and support, communication and follow-up care. This means, in practice, that there is overlap with municipal sub-processes such as registration, support and care and communication. Although the municipality is responsible for coordinating these processes, a link could be established with the crisis organisation of an air carrier during the actual implementation. The investigation by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice shows that the government parties insufficiently consider the fact (or probability of the fact) that at the airport, apart from the airport itself, several parties could have an important role and interest in the control and handling of an incident.

A good example of such cooperation can be found at Rotterdam The Hague Airport. In consultation with the airport, the municipality of Rotterdam, the Rotterdam-Rijnmond security region and the Royal Marechaussee, air carriers made agreements on the division of tasks and responsibilities in case of a large-scale incident that goes beyond the responsibility of the airport operator. This applies, for example, to the support and care for and registration of passengers and their surviving relatives. Here, the municipality of Rotterdam adopts the position that it is ultimately responsible for the various population care processes and also coordinates these processes, but that it does not have to carry out the actual activities itself if there are any parties who are better at this. That is why specific agreements have been made for each air carrier, focusing on the capacities and resources of the air carrier's crisis organisation.

Positioning

Usually, a representative of the airport has a seat in the various consultation bodies within the regional crisis organisation (the CoPI, ROT and Policy Team). As a rule, this official is expected to act as representative of the parties present at the airport (including air carriers). This is because of this official's direct information line to the air carriers. Although the parties involved acknowledge that the airport is a party as such, they emphasise that the airport is not a representative of an air carrier. The airport has other interests and

does not have or has far less information about aircraft, passengers and their relatives. According to the parties involved, the air carrier is regarded by the government as a source of information only and has, due to this structure, little involvement in and influence on decision-making. Bilateral information exchange and coordination of work processes are inadequate due to the indirect positioning in the crisis organisation. As a result, air carriers are still insufficiently acknowledged as a primary crisis partner.

During the investigation, air carrier therefore expressed the wish to have a seat in a decision-making body in the regional crisis organisation. An advantage of this would be that the same processes are used jointly and that the government's crisis organisation could use (where necessary) the infrastructure, resources and expertise of the air carrier. In the case of Rotterdam The Hague Airport, the interest of cooperation is acknowledged by all parties and the agreement is made that, if applicable, a representative of the relevant air carrier will always have a seat in the ROT (instead of merely a representative of the airport).

Registration and sharing of information

Based on the apportionment of liability for their passengers, air carriers express their doubts and concerns about the changed policy with respect to victim registration. The Security Consultation, the national platform of the boards of the 25 security regions in the Netherlands, has adopted a new vision of population care: 'Bevolkingszorg op orde 2.0'. An important pillar of this vision is the self-reliability of victims: people who can will, in case of a low-impact incident, find their own way. The result of this policy change is that not all victims need to be registered as a standard: uninjured and self-reliant passengers can proceed on their way in case of a low-impact incident (e.g. if an aircraft skids after landing or in case of a security-related incident). These victims are expected to inform their relatives and look for medical assistance themselves if deemed necessary at a later time.

Various crisis partners point out the risk of the policy change: losing sight of the persons involved in an incident. For instance, air carrier are afraid that they will lose sight of 'their' passengers. An air carrier has an interest in maintaining a strong information position with respect to passengers, because they are often the first organisation relatives - from all over the world - call to for information about their next-of-kin. Moreover, there is a lack of clarity among air carriers about what constitutes a low-impact incident. Air carriers ask if it is possible to come up with modalities for aviation accidents between the decision to register or not. For this concerns a small, specific group of persons (whose identity is often known beforehand).

The air carriers indicate that there is a strong need for a more intensive cooperation and sharing of information with government authorities and airports. While the parties focus on the same process, they currently collect information from their own perspective and with their own resources. Facilitating and continuing information sharing in the area of passenger information is therefore important. For instance, information is combined and processed into one total overview, after which the parties can undertake the previously agreed actions again.

An example of how information can be shared efficiently between an air carrier and the government is the way in which British Airways has implemented this process for incidents taking place in the United Kingdom. Just as in the Netherlands, the air carrier is only represented there via the airport's Crisis Management Team. However, a police representative also has a seat in the crisis centre at the air carrier's headquarters in London. The air carriers interviewed within the context of this investigation have no such working method. British Airways is responsible for registering next-of-kin details and sharing these details with the police. The police are responsible for the victim registration process. The police acknowledge that in case of an aircraft accident, the air carrier will have the most useful information. That is why the sharing of information between the police and air carrier is facilitated in a matching room. In concrete terms, this means that the passenger information collected by the air carrier in its own system is compared with the information the police have available in their system. In case of a match, this will constitute verified information which can be used by the police to take further action, supported by the air carrier based on the latter's obligations.

4.2 Regional crisis organisation and criminal-law component

An aviation-related incident may quickly have a criminal-law component. On the one hand, because the Public Prosecution Service has a duty to conduct an investigation within the context of criminal prosecution and, on the other hand, because the Public Prosecution Service is the competent authority for the handling of criminal incidents such as a hijacking/hostage-taking.

The investigation shows that - in case of an aviation-related incident - processes that are in place within the context of criminal law are or may be inconsistent with the processes initiated within the context of crisis control. In most regions, during exercises and deployments in case of incidents, this gives rise to the question as to who has the competent authority: the mayor of the relevant municipality or the relevant public prosecutor.

During the incident, the mayor is responsible for maintaining public order and security, the public prosecutor is responsible for maintaining law and order. In many cases, there appears to be a lack of knowledge of each other's tasks, responsibilities and powers. Moreover, there is still insufficient awareness among the parties that a decision in one organisation may have (serious) consequences for the other organisation. According to various respondents, the tension between the mayor and the public prosecutor does not have to be a problem, as long as this clarity is offered in time during a crisis situation. That is why specific attention should be paid to practising administrative dilemmas and knowledge of administrative networks.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice also referred to this bottleneck in earlier reports. For instance, in the report on the shooting incident at De Ridderhof shopping centre in Alphen aan den Rijn, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice refers to the Explanatory Memorandum of the Security Regions Act. This states as follows: 'One can barely think of any disasters, crises or serious accidents in which criminal enforcement is not at issue, in any stage of the response. Even if the criminal-law component only starts playing an important role at a later point in time, for example because life-saving

activities need to be carried out first, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to secure the interests of the criminal investigation as much as possible. In the local triumvirate, the mayor, public prosecutor and chief of police will coordinate the policy on the execution of tasks by the police.’

According to various respondents, it may be advisable to set up a fixed team of mayors and public prosecutors who have more experience with and knowledge of managing large-scale incidents. For valuable time may be wasted on discussions about the competent authority. This way, administrators will be selected and hired primarily for their competences and experience with respect to crisis control. For such a team, a number of crisis managers with the necessary competences and experience could be appointed among the circle of mayors and the public prosecutor's offices. In such a setting, the responsible mayor and public prosecutor would always have a seat in the crisis team for decision-making purposes.

4.3 Link between regional crisis organisation and central government

Due to the ‘global scale of business’ of the aviation sector, an aviation-related incident will soon have a national and international image. It is therefore not inconceivable for the central government to have or assume a role at any time. As described in §2.2.1, this has been provided for via GRIP-Central Government. If the central government's crisis organisation enters into force, it will make decisions at a strategic level. The actual implementation will, however, remain with the regional parties. The central government will not take over the coordination of the entire incident, but only some aspects, for example communication, diplomatic contacts or facilitating access to more capacity and resources.

However, almost all parties involved in this investigation are currently unaware of the central government's role in case of a large-scale incident or during large events. The parties are insufficiently familiar with the lines of communication and decision-making. The parties involved consider this to be a significant risk factor, because if the lines are unclear, this will result in a delay and confusion in controlling an incident. The impression is that the Dutch crisis structure is unnecessarily complex compared to that in other countries. For instance, several officials have the wrong idea that if the central government is involved in the control or handling of an incident, the regional crisis organisation can be scaled down (unless it maintains the operational coordination of the incident).

Moreover, almost all parties argue that GRIP-Central Government has been ‘rolled out’ across the country, but that they have been insufficiently involved in its implementation. This is illustrated by the fact that since the introduction of GRIP-Central Government scenarios in April 2013, these scenarios have not yet been practised. According to them, this is a vulnerable situation.

There often appears to be a link with the central government, but mainly with the policy department responsible for civil aviation security.⁸ Due to the confidential nature of the activities, however, this department is usually in direct contact with the Royal Marechaussee, the airport and, where necessary, the air carriers. The purpose of this contact is to

⁸ Surveillance, Security and Civil Aviation Department of the NCTV, Ministry of Security and Justice

coordinate matters affecting civil aviation security at the airport. These matters may, however, have a wide impact on the regional crisis organisation of the security region. One is still insufficiently aware and takes insufficient account of this interaction. For measures taken within the context of civil aviation security may have an impact on the processes initiated within the context of crisis control, such as population care and communication. This also applies to measures that are taken within the context of the Surveillance and Security system. In a number of events, this resulted in practical problems, such as the preparations for the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014 in The Hague and establishing a disaster recovery site for aircraft at other airports.

The investigation shows that there is no robust and clear link between the crisis organisation at the airport and the central government. There are actually two lines to organisations at central government level: on the one hand from the approach to civil aviation security and surveillance and security and, on the other hand, from disaster and crisis control (and preparations for disaster and crisis control). Both parts function separately from each other due to the nature of their activities, but, for the outside world, function as a whole, i.e. the central government. This results in a vulnerable situation in which lines of communication and decision-making are unclear already during preparations for crisis control and will, in all probability, result in confusion and duplication of activities also during an actual incident.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice believes that both the central government and the regional parties have a responsibility to provide clarity. The policy departments involved at the airport, as well as all crisis partners at the airport, have so far succeeded insufficiently in obtaining the necessary information.

Partial conclusion

Link between air carrier crisis organisation and regional crisis organisation

- Air carriers are still not always considered a full crisis partner. There is insufficient knowledge of the tasks and responsibilities of an air carrier and the crisis organisation it has set up.
- There is insufficient awareness of the capacity and resources of an air carrier and of the way in which they can be used in the crisis organisation.
- Within the crisis organisation, air carriers are generally not positioned at the level where they can have a say in decisions that concern them directly.
- There is no intensive cooperation and sharing of information between government authorities, airports and air carriers. While the parties focus on the same process, they currently collect information from their own perspective and with their own resources. Facilitating and ensuring information sharing in the area of passenger information and registration is particularly important.

Regional crisis organisation and criminal-law component

- There appears to be a lack of clarity among many of the parties involved about mutual tasks, responsibilities and powers. As a result, there is insufficient awareness that a decision made in one organisation may affect the other organisation. This creates a field of tension between, on the one hand, the crisis organisation under the supervision of the mayor and, on the other hand, the criminal-law component under the supervision of the public prosecutor. Both have their own responsibilities and powers during a crisis or incident.

Link between regional crisis organisation and central government

- There is no robust link between the regional crisis organisation and the central government. During the preparations, insufficient clear agreements were made on the division of tasks in case of aviation-related incidents in which the central government plays a role (for example in a GRIP-Central Government situation). This may, during an actual incident, result in a lack of clarity in the execution and a duplication of activities. Both the central government and the regional parties have been unable to provide each other with any clarity in this respect.
- The central government has various lines of communication from and to the crisis organisation at airports. It concerns, for example, the policy department focusing on security-related matters and the department that has a coordinating role during an actual incident. Moreover, there is insufficient awareness that a decision made by one party may affect the other party.

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Annex Abbreviations

CoPI	<i>Commando Plaats Incident</i> (Incident Site Command)
CVO	<i>Commissie van Overleg</i> (Committee of Consultation)
EA	Eindhoven Airport
ERT	Emergency Response Team
GAE	Groningen Airport Eelde
GBT	<i>Gemeentelijk Beleidsteam</i> (Municipal Policy Team)
GRIP	<i>Gecoördineerde Regionale Incident Bestrijdings Procedure</i> (Coordinated Regional Incident Control Procedure)
IL&T	<i>Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport</i> (Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate)
KMar	<i>Koninklijke Marechaussee</i> (Royal Marechaussee)
LVNL	<i>Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland</i> (Air Traffic Control the Netherlands)
MAA	Maastricht Aachen Airport
MCCb	<i>Ministeriële Commissie Crisisbeheersing</i> (Ministerial Crisis Control Committee)
NCTV	<i>Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme en Veiligheid</i> (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism)
ROT	Regional Operational Team
RTHA	Rotterdam The Hague Airport

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