



Inspectorate
Ministry of Security and Justice

Evaluation of the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism

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Preface

Recent attacks in Western Europe show the seriousness of the terrorist threat. Although the attacks vary in nature and scope, it is clear that the attackers are largely inspired by the violent ideology of IS and Al-Qaeda. Time after time, the attacks trigger a wave of revulsion and horror and there are calls for a robust response. The threat level in the Netherlands has been 'substantial' for some years now. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*, NCTV) states that the greatest threat is currently posed by jihadist groups.

In August 2014 the NCTV and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment issued The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism. The goal of the Action Programme is to limit the threat posed by jihadism. Now that the Action Programme has been in place for two-and-a-half years, it is time to take stock. What has succeeded? What has not, or not yet, succeeded? What has gone well? And what could be done better or differently? In order to gain answers to these questions, the NCTV and the Ministry of Social Affairs requested the Inspectorate of Security and Justice (*Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie*) to make an evaluation of the Action Programme. This is an investigation of the way that organisations are implementing the measures from the Action Programme; it is not an investigation of the effects these measures have had. The evaluation focuses chiefly on further improvement of the approach to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice concludes that the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism has provided positive momentum to the integral approach. The points for improvement proposed in this report can serve to further improve the approach and to put the measures in the Action Programme on a more permanent and regular footing. This reflects the great importance of these measures in the fight against radicalisation, extremism and terrorism in the Netherlands.

J.G. Bos
Head of the inspectorate for Security and Justice



Summary, conclusions and recommendations

Introduction

In August 2014 the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*, NCTV) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment issued the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism (hereinafter: the Action Programme). This contains 38 measures aimed at limiting the threat posed by jihadism. It was intended to provide an impetus to the integral approach by intensifying existing measures and creating new measures on the basis of the threat.

The NCTV and its chain partners need insight into how the measures from the Action Programme are being applied in practice so that they can, if necessary, make adjustments and improve the approach. In this context the NCTV and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment asked the Inspectorate of Security and Justice to conduct an evaluation as the independent supervisor. This study centres on the following research questions:

1. *To what extent have the measures, as formulated in the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism, been implemented and/or applied?*
2. *What experiences, best practices and points for improvement have the involved organisations acquired through the application of these measures?*

Scope

Scope in terms of measures

The Action Programme contains 38 measures. Besides reducing the threat posed by certain individuals, the Action Programme aims at prevention. Here a distinction is drawn between prevention aimed at individuals and prevention aimed at society and certain groups within society. The first form of prevention comes under the responsibility of the NCTV, while the second form is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice has not studied all the measures itself. In the study, the Inspectorate focuses on the local approach and the effects of a number of national measures. Some measures are either of international nature and thus outside the Inspectorate's authority or are being studied by another organisation. Consequently the Inspectorate has requested the NCTV and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment to provide written information on a number of measures. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice set out a framework



for this in advance and includes the findings in this inspection report. Appendix I contains an overview of all measures and indicates which measures have been studied by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice itself.

Scope in terms of studied organisations

Various organisations have their own tasks as part of the integral approach to jihadism. At the local level, municipal authorities are in charge of both the broad preventive approach and the person-specific measures. In addition, a number of organisations under the authority of the Ministry of Security and Justice also carry out tasks. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice has involved the following organisations in the study:

- Municipal authorities;
- National Police Force;
- Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar);
- Public Prosecution Service (OM);
- Dutch Probation Service (RN);
- Child Care and Protection Board (RvdK);
- National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV);
- General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD);
- Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) ;
- Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI).

The approach to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism is largely conducted in the local context in which municipal authorities operate. This is why the Inspectorate of Security and Justice took four municipal authorities as the starting point for this study, interviewing the chain partners in these areas. In addition, the Inspectorate interviewed organisations that do not work exclusively in the local context such as the Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI).

Research methods

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice applied various research methods to gain insight into how the studied measures are being applied. The Inspectorate administered a digital questionnaire to all municipal authorities, requested and studied documents, conducted interviews and attended various case consultations.

Conclusion, points for attention and good practices

The text box on the following page sets out the conclusion and points for attention in general terms. Later in this document these are discussed in more detail and augmented with good practices.



Added value of the Action Programme

The Action Programme has had an acceleratory effect on the integral approach to jihadism and has demonstrated its added value. Most measures in the Action Programme have been implemented and/or are being applied. Responsible organisations do not consider any measures to be lacking in this context. Implementation of the measures has led, among other things, to alliances and new organisations and has given impetus to the development of knowledge in organisations. Municipal authorities are collaborating at the local level with various partners from both the security domain and the social domain. In view of the urgency this is generally taking place on the basis of equality. Partners lend joint form to both the person-specific approach and the preventative approach.

Points of attention for the Action Programme

In the study the Inspectorate of Security and Justice identified three points of attention. These are not only relevant for tackling jihadism, but also for the integral approach to other societal security problems.

Point of attention 1: weighing up the need to share information is person-specific

In the person-specific approach to radicalisation, the organisations involved must share information with each other in order to jointly assess and judge a case. In doing so, the organisations are bound to the applicable legislation and regulations. The issue of whether and under what circumstances it is permissible to share personal data depends on the concrete case and needs to be weighed up. This weighing up is not always easy, even when it comes to tackling jihadism. As such, this creates the risk that relevant information is not shared in the framework of the integral approach. The NCTV has drawn up a model agreement to clarify the basic principles for processing personal data, to ensure that data processing is conducted on a legal basis and with care and that confidentiality of the personal data that partners supply to each other is guaranteed. It is still too early to say how much this agreement contributes to greater clarity on the possibilities for sharing information.

Point of attention 2: interference between measures

The second point of attention concerns interference between person-specific measures. When employing multiple measures for the person-specific approach it may happen that the measures do not reinforce each other but actually counteract each other. This has a negative influence on the intended effect. One example of this is to prosecute a person travelling out and simultaneously to declare this person an undesirable alien. By declaring someone an undesirable alien, the person travelling out now has no further access to the Netherlands, while this is a necessary condition for securing executing a criminal conviction. Another example concerns the asset-freezing measure with which the government can freeze financial assets. In combination with other measures such as stripping a person of Dutch nationality or declaring the person an undesirable alien, this can have adverse effects. Here it is possible that these measures, combined with each other, isolate the subject. This can affect the process of radicalisation.



Point of attention 3: central accountability methodology is not in line with the aim of the Action Programme

The approach to extremism and terrorism is accompanied by strong (political) interest. The organisations involved are thus expected to render themselves accountable at the national level for their activities with a degree of regularity. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that the current accountability methodology is not properly geared to the work for which the accountability must be rendered. The accountability is more quantitative in nature. Various chain partners question whether this manner of reporting is meaningful. What significance, for instance, is attached to the number of people who are being prosecuted?

Outlook to the future

The challenge now is to secure the approach to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism within routine working processes. Combating these issues will remain relevant in the coming years. The approach now focuses chiefly on the jihadist threat. However, chain partners also recognise other forms of extremism. The Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands supports this view, and so the approach must address these aspects, too. The current focus on the issue is already bearing fruit. In order to harvest these fruits in the future, too, this field must remain a focus of attention so that the alliances continue to function well and knowledge remains up to date.

Networks and internal organisations formed in response to a need

At the commencement of the Action Programme the NCTV aimed to broaden and intensify the integral approach. This needed to be realised through cooperation between organisations. The programme does not designate in advance which organisations should be involved in tackling radicalisation. Municipal authorities are assigned responsibility for leading the local approach. On the basis of this responsibility they have chosen to work together with the parties that provide added value in a case or for a particular theme. In this way fluid alliances have been formed, with the composition possibly varying per case or theme.

Good practice: high willingness and motivation to cooperate

The cooperation both between and within organisations is based on the need for such cooperation. As a result, all parties have high willingness and motivation. This benefits cooperation and thus the results of their actions.

In addition to cooperation between organisations, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that organisations have also organised themselves internally in order to equip themselves as well as possible for dealing with radicalisation. Here too, there was no formulation of conditions that needed to be met; instead this was organised on the basis of current needs and in response to the local situation. To give one example, police units carry out this task in various ways. Some units have organised this at unit level, others at district level.



Differences between small, medium-sized and large municipal authorities

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice asked municipal authorities about a number of basic characteristics of the local approach to radicalisation and jihadism. This has revealed that there are statistically significant differences between small, medium-sized and large municipal authorities. Large municipal authorities carry out more activities to combat radicalisation than do small municipal authorities and they also more often have a specific policy for this. Medium-sized municipal authorities take an intermediate position here. Some municipal authorities that undertook little or no activity in this area explained this by saying that radicalisation was not an issue in the municipal authority. Generally speaking municipal authorities are only prepared to invest in the approach when it transpires that radicalisation is occurring in the specific municipal authority. This is something of a 'chicken or egg' situation: one can ask how far it can be established whether radicalisation is occurring when staff are not previously trained in this field.

Knowledge and expertise have grown thanks to the Action Programme

In order to understand radicalisation and to find the right approach, knowledge is required about the ways in which people can radicalise and the processes that play a role in this. One important goal when drawing up the Action Programme was to increase the relevant knowledge and expertise in the involved organisations. To this end various parties have developed courses and training opportunities. In the public sector the *Dutch Training Institute for the Prevention of Radicalisation (ROR)*, the Centre of Expertise on Social Stability (ESS) and the School Safety Foundation (*Stichting School en Veiligheid*) offer training courses. Various organisations make use of these facilities.

Good practice: high degree of expertise in the TER-team

The Dutch Probation Service has set up a nationally operating TER (TER stands for Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation) team in which knowledge and expertise are concentrated. This team deals with all affairs in which terrorism, extremism or radicalisation play a role. Various experts, such as a theologian or a psychologist, support the team and thus enable the probation workers to make use of their specific expertise. This expertise is valued by chain partners.

The content and quality of the training courses is important. Consequently the NCTV (in addition to a number of academics) sits on the committee that approves the training courses of the ROR, giving the NCTV influence over the content and quality.

In addition to the training courses provided by the government, there are also private suppliers of training courses. Organisations that have used the services of private suppliers indicate that they are satisfied with these. One point of attention is that the NCTV has no influence on the content of these training courses. There is thus little insight into the content and quality of these training courses.

Custom solutions for interventions

70 percent of the municipal authorities has organised a local case consultation. During a case consultation, persons are discussed who are radicalising or are in danger of radicalisation, or of travelling out. Organisations participating here, besides the municipal authority itself, always include the police and the Public Prosecution Service. In addition, other organisations that have useful knowledge on



the case in question also participate. These may be the Child Care and Protection Board (RvdK), the Probation Service or a (representative of) a Social District Team. The case consultation jointly determines which measure(s) are required in a case. Following this, the actual application of a measure is to be carried out by the organisation that holds responsibility on the basis of its defined task. The Public Prosecution Service, for instance, is authorised to make criminal prosecutions and the Dutch Probation Service (RN) supervises any conditions that have been imposed.

Good practice: ensuring the quality of case-specific measures

In Amsterdam staff from fourteen organisations have been partially assigned to the role of case manager. They have received training funded by the municipal authority and participate in the radicalisation case discussions. The choice of case manager depends on the primary problem/issue in the case. The case manager coordinates the case, draws up the plan of action and records the progress made. This means that the coordination is carried out by a single person, thus ensuring the quality of case-specific measures.

The motto for the case consultation is 'custom solutions'. Since no two cases are the same, it is important that possible interventions are focused on the specific problems relating to the person under discussion. Familiarity with the possible measures is important in order to be able to apply the right measures. The study shows that municipal authorities are familiar with most measures contained in the Action Programme, involving an intervention at case level or on a broader basis. Exceptions to this are the Exit facility, the asset-freezing measure and the Centre of Expertise on Social Stability (ESS). The Exit facility supports people who wish to distance themselves from jihadism. The asset-freezing measure is used to freeze financial assets so that the person concerned can no longer access them. The Centre of Expertise enhances the flow of information to the state and municipal authorities about social tensions and radicalisation. Most municipal authorities are not familiar with these three measures.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice also asked whether a number of specific measures are being applied in the municipal authority. The study reveals that most of the applied measures are of a preventative nature. These involve cooperation with the Muslim community, support for educational institutions and increasing the promotion of expertise. Person-specific measures such as the passport measure or criminal prosecution are applied less often.

Information sharing is a point of attention

In the person-specific approach to radicalisation, involved organisations need to share information with each other in order to jointly assess a case. When sharing personal data, organisations are subject to the applicable legislation and regulations such as the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wbp), the Judicial Data and Criminal Records Act and the Police Data Act.¹ Whether and under what circumstances it is permissible to share personal data depends on the case in question and requires a weighing up of the situation. This weighing up is not always

¹ See also the Agreement on the person-specific approach to prevention of radicalisation and extremism (*Convenant persoonsgerichte aanpak voorkoming radicalisering en extremisme*). NCTV. January 2017.



simple, as is the case in the context of tackling jihadism. This creates the risk that relevant information is not shared in the framework of the integral approach. It is precisely in this area that multiple indications taken together can point to radicalisation, while a single indication need not lead to such a conclusion. So it is difficult to estimate whether sharing of personal data is permissible. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice thus notes that staff take varying approaches to this issue and weigh up factors differently. In order to clarify the basic principles for handling personal data, to ensure that handling of this data takes place in a legal and careful manner and that confidentiality of the personal data shared by partners is guaranteed, the NCTV has drawn up a model agreement. Currently, it is too early to say that the problems regarding information sharing have been solved with the creation of the model agreement.

Measures can counteract each other

The Action Programme consists in part of existing measures and in part of new measures. This has created a broad range of possibilities for intervention. Organisations indicate that this gives them sufficient possibilities for intervening. One point of attention relates to the interference involved in the simultaneous application of different measures. To give one example, freezing financial assets can have a counterproductive effect on the efforts of a family support centre of the Probation Services. Moreover, freezing assets in combination with, for instance, the passport measures can lead to (increased) isolation of the subject. This can in turn influence the radicalisation process. There is also potential tension between criminal prosecution of a traveller and declaring this person an undesirable alien. The Public Prosecution Service may decide to prosecute a traveller due to a suspected crime. However, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) can, on behalf of the Minister of Security and Justice, declare the same person to be an undesirable alien so that he or she may not enter the Netherlands for reasons of national security.

The potential tension between criminal law and immigration law essentially revolves around one complicated issue, namely choosing between, on the one hand, protecting the rule of law by instituting criminal prosecution and, on the other hand, removing the threat by refusing someone entry to the Netherlands. In such cases the Public Prosecution Service and the IND consult on the approach to be taken. Although the Public Prosecution Service can independently decide whether criminal prosecution is opportune, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice finds it important that organisations are aware of the existing fields of tension and make use of consultative structures to arrive as far as possible at an integral approach within which measures reinforce or augment each other. This means jointly determining a goal and then which means are the most suitable for achieving this. In the example of the asset-freezing measure this concerns an accumulation of measures that might possibly have adverse effects.

Central accountability not in line with the aim of the programme

At the national level the Minister of Security and Justice sends a progress report on the Action Programme to the House of Representatives every four months. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice notes that involved organisations are not satisfied with this system. The accountability is often of a quantitative nature and as a result the current representation of the approach is not geared to the content of the work. Various chain partners question whether this manner of reporting is meaningful. The Inspectorate agrees that, for instance, the number of people who are being prosecuted says little about the quality of the approach.



Outlook to the future

Professionals broadly share the view that the current threat will continue for some years. The greatest threat is currently jihadist in nature. Recent attacks in Western Europe show that this threat is still substantial and can have very serious consequences. However, chain partners also recognise other forms of extremism. This means that attention for tackling extremism and terrorism must be consolidated and broadened. It is important that current knowledge, expertise and capacity remain in place in order to maintain the integral approach at its requisite level.

In the further development of this policy and the ensuring of its status, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice makes the following recommendations to the NCTV to ensure that this policy can be further developed and secured:

Recommendations

1. Ensure that organisations can report about the approach in a meaningful way.
2. Ensure, maintain and expand the integral approach. In doing so, devote particular attention to the ability to identify further developments in radicalisation and other forms of extremism in a timely manner.
3. Invest in further cooperation between municipal authorities so that they are properly equipped to make a substantiated decision as to whether an investment in tackling radicalisation is necessary with regard to the issue at hand.



1

Introduction

In June 2014 the General Intelligence and Security Service (*Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst*, AIVD) issued the report 'Transformation of jihadism in the Netherlands' (*Transformatie van het jihadisme in Nederland*). The AIVD concluded that: 'As a result of developments in the Netherlands and the conflict in Syria, in recent years Dutch jihadism has become far more extensive and unpredictable a phenomenon than ever before.' This increase in the threat prompted the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding and Veiligheid*, NCTV) to take measures. In August of that year the NCTV, in conjunction with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, published the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism (hereinafter: the Action Programme), which contains 38 measures aimed at limiting the threat posed by jihadism.

1.1 Reasons

By means of the Action Programme the government aims to protect democracy and the rule of law, to weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands and to remove the breeding ground for radicalisation. The 38 measures vary in nature and complexity. Some of them are new, some comprise previously existing measures that are being continued or strengthened. The organisations that are required to implement the measures are diverse, including both judicial and non-judicial organisations. A number of measures are implemented at the local level, and others at national level.

The NCTV and its chain partners need insight into how the measures from the Action Programme are being applied in practice. This will enable the NCTV to make adjustments in good time to ensure that jihadism can be tackled more effectively, also considering rounding up the Action Programme. In this context the NCTV and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment asked the Inspectorate of Security and Justice to conduct a study of the Action as the independent supervisor.



1.2 Research questions

With this study, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice aims to provide insight into how the measures from the Action Programme are working in practice. This leads to the following research questions:

4. *To what extent have the measures, as formulated in the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism, been implemented and/or applied?*
5. *What experiences, best practices and points for improvement have the involved organisations acquired through the application of these measures?*

The measures have a range of goals. Some measures focus on developing and intensifying alliances, while other measures are aimed at providing authorisation for confiscating a passport (the Action Programme contains both existing and new powers). So for some of the measures the question is whether they have been implemented, and for some the question of the extent to which they have been applied.

1.3 Scope

Scope in terms of measures

The Action Programme contains 38 measures. Besides reducing the threat posed by certain individuals, the Action Programme aims at prevention. Here a distinction is drawn between prevention aimed at individuals and prevention aimed at (groups in) society. The first form of prevention comes under the responsibility of the NCTV, while the second form is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice has not studied all the measures itself. Consequently, the Inspectorate requested the NCTV and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment to provide written information on a number of measures. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice set out a framework for this in advance and includes these findings in this inspection report. Measures involving international cooperating and combating terrorist travel movements fall outside the authority and expertise of the Inspectorate and hence are not included in the study. Appendix I contains an overview of all measures and indicates which measures have been studied by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice itself.

Scope in terms of studied organisations

Various organisations have their own tasks as part of the integral approach to jihadism. At the local level, municipal authorities are in charge of both the broad preventative approach and the person-specific measures. In addition, a number of organisations under the authority of the Ministry of Security and Justice also carry out tasks. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice has involved the following organisations in the study:

- Municipal authorities
- National Police Force
- Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar)
- Public Prosecution Service
- Dutch Probation Service (RN)



- Child Care and Protection Board (RvdK)
- National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV)
- General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)
- Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND)
- Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI)

The problem of radicalisation and jihadism is most visible in the local context in which municipal authorities operate. This is why the Inspectorate of Security and Justice took four municipal authorities as the starting point for this study, interviewing the chain partners in these areas.

1.4 Operationalisation

As described in the previous section, there are two research questions. One research question focuses on the aspects of 'implementation' and 'application of the measures' as the subject of research, while the other research question examines the aspects of 'experiences', 'best practices' and 'lessons learned by involved parties'.

In order to identify the extent to which a measure has been implemented or applied, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice has operationalised the first research question below.

1.4.1 Implementation and application

The first research question has been operationalised in three terms. These are sequentially: 'alliances', 'application of measures' and 'knowledge and expertise'.

Alliances

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice researched which organisations cooperate and in which ways. One element here is information sharing.

Information sharing

It is important that information on a radicalised, or possibly radicalised, person reaches the right parties on time so that the case can be assessed in good time to determine the most effective intervention strategy. Consequently the Inspectorate of Security and Justice charted how the flow of information functions within the alliances. In this respect the following questions played a guiding role: 'with which organisations is information shared, under what conditions and through what channels?'

Application of measures

Intervention

Once information has become available, this can prompt an intervention. The Action Programme contains measures that offer possibilities for interventions. Parties may, for instance, institute interventions based on criminal or administrative law. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice charted which organisations are responsible for which measures. In addition, the Inspectorate researched the extent to which the involved parties are familiar with the intervention possibilities and whether these intervention possibilities meet the needs of the involved organisations. Are the interventions available, practicable and put into use?



Evaluation and monitoring

Once an intervention has been initiated, it is important that the involved parties monitor the progress. This enables them to determine whether the desired affect is being achieved or whether they need to make adjustments. Another important question is whether the intervention is still required after some time has passed. One relevant instance here is the measure with which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can freeze financial assets. The Inspectorate thus researched the ways in which involved parties monitor the intervention.

Knowledge and expertise

Involved organisations require expertise in order to be able to interpret information and to make a decision about a possible intervention. The Inspectorate has charted how the requisite knowledge and expertise is supplied. Attention was given here to training courses, as well as the available and required capacity. In addition the Inspectorate researched which elements of organisations are responsible for the issue of radicalisation.

1.4.2 Experiences, best practices and lessons learned

The second research question addresses the question of how implementing organisations view the measures in the Action Programme. Do they feel that they are sufficiently equipped to apply the measures and do they feel that they are sufficiently able to combat the threat posed by jihadists? In this context the Inspectorate of Security and Justice sets out best practices and lessons learned.

1.5 Research methods

Document study

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice examined the documents of relevance to this study in which policy (local or otherwise) is set out. Furthermore the Inspectorate examined literature on trends in society and other research reports. Appendix II contains an overview of the consulted documentation.

Digital questionnaire

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice administered a digital questionnaire to all municipal authorities in the Netherlands. In this questionnaire the Inspectorate asked municipal authorities about a number of general characteristics of the local approach to radicalisation and jihadism. 196 of the 384 municipal authorities completed the questionnaire. The Inspectorate matched the answers to the size of the municipal authority as quoted by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).

Interviews

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice conducted interviews with officials to chart their experiences in greater depth. This serves to augment and enhance the information gained through other research methods. The interviews were held with, among others, the participants of the case consultations and administrative parties. The Inspectorate did not previously have a complete overview of organisations and officials engaged in dealing with radicalisation, thus it selected some of the interviewees in the course of the study.



Attendance at case consultations

In order to gain a good picture of the case consultations, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice attended three case consultations.

1.6 Readers' guide

Chapter Two contains a number of relevant definitions and it sketches current trends and developments in the field. Some of these developments are indeed relevant to the integral approach. The approach itself is dealt with in the following chapters. In Chapter Three the Inspectorate describes which organisations cooperate in which combinations. Chapter Four deals with the application of measures and Chapter Five describes the knowledge and expertise that organisations have available in order to tackle radicalisation.



2

Radicalisation, extremism and terrorism

Radicalisation, extremism, terrorism are terms that stand in close relation to each other in policymaking. Measures taken by municipal authorities with regard to these issues are complimentary. Professionals broadly share the view that this will remain important in the coming years. This not only involves the jihadist threat, but also other forms of extremism and terrorism.

The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism is intended to combat the increasing jihadist threat. The greatest threat is still posed from this quarter.² The Action Programme focuses on tackling extremism and terrorism. The terms radicalisation, extremism and terrorism are often cited in both national and local policy. But what do we actually mean with these terms?

2.1 Definitions

Radicalisation is broader than jihadism

The NCTV defines radicalisation in the Action Programme as follows:

'An attitude that shows a person is willing to accept the ultimate consequence of a mind-set and to turn them into actions. These actions can result in the escalation of generally manageable oppositions up to a level they destabilise society due to the use of violence, in conduct that deeply hurts people or affects their freedom or in groups turning away from society.'

Jihadist ideology is currently the radical tendency that poses the greatest threat. But radicalisation can appear in other quarters, too. One example is the conviction of five men from Enschede for throwing Molotov cocktails at a mosque in Enschede.³ This was action committed by the extreme right.

Not only does radicalisation have many faces; there are also various paths by which persons can radicalise. Academic literature cites various development paths and

² Terrorist Threat Assessment of the Netherlands 44, April 2017. NCTV.

³ Judgement by District Court Overijssel, 27 October 2016, accessed via: www.rechtspraak.nl.



trigger factors.^{4 5} So far no academic consensus has been reached about the way a person radicalises.

Radicalisation is addressed in both local and national policy. This issue involves a broad spectrum of radical ideologies that pose a threat to the democratic rule of law and the safety of citizens.

Extremism and terrorism

The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020 defines extremism as follows:

*'A phenomenon whereby individuals or groups who are motivated by a certain ideology engage in serious criminal behaviour or take actions that undermine the democratic legal order.'*⁶

The definition of terrorism set out in this document is as follows:

'the perpetration of ideologically inspired acts of violence against people or of acts intended to cause property damage and calculated to result in social disruption, in order to undermine and destabilise society, create a climate of fear among the general public or influence political decision-making.'

What both terms have in common is that they involve ideological motives and breaking the law. The difference lies in the willingness to break the law and actually breaking the law. With the Action Programme the government focuses on both variants.

2.2 Trends and developments

Extremism and terrorism have been in existence for a long time: consider the IRA in Ireland or ETA in Spain. Radicalisation is not a new phenomenon either. As early as 2004 the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) already reported on 'radicalisation tendencies' in its annual report.⁷ The murder of Theo van Gogh was a sign that the threat was present in the Netherlands as well. The issue was also discussed in the 2006 annual report.⁸ In the following years the government has formulated specific policy in this area. One example is the Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011⁹ in which the government set out three goals:

- Prevention of (further) processes of isolation, polarisation and radicalisation (...) (prevention).
- Early identification of these processes by authorities and professionals and development of an appropriate approach (proaction).
- Exclusion of persons who have transgressed clear boundaries and ensuring that their influence on others is limited as far as possible (repression).

⁴ A.R. Feddes, L. Nickolson, B. Doosje. *Triggerfactoren in het radicaliseringsproces*. WODC, judicial studies. Radicalisation and terrorism. May 2016.

⁵ *Triggerfactoren in het radicaliseringsproces. In het kort*. Centre of Expertise on Social Stability. 2016.

⁶ National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020.

⁷ General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). *Annual Report 2004*. April 2005.

⁸ General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). *Annual Report 2006*. April 2007.

⁹ Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.



During this period the issue received (political) attention and municipal authorities formulated corresponding policy. In the years following this Action Programme less attention was devoted to the issue. Due partly to this, other themes were given priority and specific policy for combating radicalisation 'ebbed away', so to speak.

The declaration of the caliphate by IS in the summer of 2014 once again strengthened the perceived need for action. Due in part to this, the NCTV and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment issued the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism in August 2014. The Action Programme assigns municipal authorities the role of local coordinator for tackling radicalisation and polarisation.

Extremism and terrorism in relation to polarisation

The Action Programme focuses specifically on reducing the threat of extremism and terrorism. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice notes that municipal authorities in particular include the term polarisation in the approach. So what is polarisation and why do municipal authorities involve this aspect as well?

Polarisation is 'the intensification of contrasts between groups in society which can lead to tension between these groups and an increase in segregation (along ethnic and religious lines)'.¹⁰ Polarisation is expressed, among other ways, in fierce opposition in debates. Protests and demonstrations can also be examples of this.

The municipal authorities interviewed by the Inspectorate cited polarisation as one of the issues to which they aim to devote attention. They state that they have insight into possible contrasts between communities residing within the municipal authority.

Radicalisation, extremism and terrorism remain an issue

With regard to the possible development of radicalisation and polarisation, the professionals in the field state almost unanimously that these will remain important themes in the future, too. They believe that the threat is posed not only by jihadism but can also come from other sources. In addition, see the following quote by the head of MI6 in the United Kingdom:

*'Allied with the emergence of state failure this means that, regrettably, this is an enduring issue which will certainly be with us, I believe, for our professional lifetime.'*¹¹

¹⁰ Definition derived from the Netherlands Youth Institute, accessed via: www.nji.nl.

¹¹ Accessed via: www.theguardian.com.



3

Cooperation in networks

At the local level, municipal authorities play a coordinating role in tackling radicalisation. They have drawn up policy to this end and many carry out case consultations in which persons are discussed who are (in danger of) radicalising. Not all municipal authorities carry out such work to the same degree: there are significant differences between large and small municipal authorities. Large municipal authorities undertake more and/or more frequent activities than small municipal authorities.

Municipal authorities cooperate with various organisations, both within and outside the security domain. Municipal authorities take a pragmatic approach and get those parties involved that offer added value. This means that work is conducted in varying constellations. This process is working well. The cooperation aims to identify radicalisation, to carry out interventions where necessary and then to evaluate and monitor the case. Information sharing is a point of attention in such cooperation because it is possible that not all information is disclosed.

In an integral approach it is important that organisations arrive at the right combination of interventions together, and in doing so achieve the desired result. The study indicates that various organisations, from various domains, do indeed cooperate. This is most evident in the local case consultation, in which several organisations come together to discuss cases and to make arrangements.

3.1 Activities

Organisations have assigned internal responsibility for tackling radicalisation and they cooperate with other organisations in networks. What precisely do they do?

Prevention

One important task carried out by municipal authorities in collaboration with various partners is the prevention of radicalisation. This is not focused on individuals like it is in the person-specific approach, but instead on broad groups. Examples here include provision of information in schools and neighbourhood projects. The



prevention is aimed at strengthening the resilience of groups of people, undermining the jihadist offerings and reducing possible breeding grounds.¹²

Identifying radicalisation

One important task carried out by organisations is identifying radicalisation. This involves recognising that a person is radicalising in a way that may pose a threat to national security and the democratic rule of law. The process of identification mostly takes place through contact with individual persons. Community police officers have many contacts with individuals, while the municipal authority and care providers also see many people. In addition, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) is able to identify radicalisation in of persons using its own methods.

Interventions

If it is established that a person is radicalising, then the parties discuss which intervention is necessary and appropriate in a case consultation. Organisations have many possibilities to intervene. The municipal authority can take measures to influence the financial situation of individuals. Care services can be deployed if mental health problems are identified. Other possibilities include administrative measures such as confiscation of the passport so that the individual cannot travel out of the country or to declare the individual an undesirable alien so that a traveller cannot return to the country. The Public Prosecution Service can decide to institute a criminal prosecution. Please refer to Section 4.2 for a number of possible interventions.

Evaluation and monitoring

After interventions have been carried out, the case consultation monitors the case to see whether the intended effect has been achieved. To this end interventions can be scaled down or indeed other interventions be implemented. If a case is going well, it is scaled down. This means that it is no longer discussed at the case consultation. Further effort is invested in the case, but this is then the responsibility of the organisations involved.

3.2 Cooperation between organisations

3.2.1 Municipal authorities as coordinator of the local approach

Measure 30: The cabinet supports the local approach in priority areas.¹³

This measure is further developed in the Action Programme and entails, among other things, that 'involved municipal authorities arrange multidisciplinary case consultations in which first-line professionals draw on their expertise to share information about indications of jihadist radicalisation, travel and/or return in order to arrive at a joint assessment'. The measure assigns municipal authorities the important task of organising the case consultation.

In addition to Measure 30 there are several other measures that assign responsibility to the municipal authorities. In line with this, municipal authorities are the designated organisations for formulating and implementing a large part of the

¹² *Evaluatieverslag preventieve aanpak*. NCTV. January 2017.

¹³ A full overview of the measures is contained in Appendix I.



preventative policy (including Measures 21, 22, 23 and 26). Furthermore municipal authorities alert the person's immediate circle if it is suspected that a person is travelling out (Measure 16). Municipal authorities thus have a leading role to play in the policy for combating radicalisation.

Half of the municipal authorities has a policy on radicalisation

By means of a digital questionnaire, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice asked municipal authorities, among other things, whether they had a policy with regard to radicalisation. 51 percent of the municipal authorities indicated that they do not have a policy, while 47 percent indicated that they do have a policy. Here there is a statistically significant difference between small and large municipal authorities.^{14 15}

All large municipal authorities that completed the questionnaire indicated that they have a policy. Of the small municipal authorities, 36 percent stated that they have a policy. The corresponding figure for medium-sized municipal authorities is 70 percent.

At most municipal authorities the policy in this field comes under the responsibility of the Public Order and Safety department. In 51 percent of the municipal authorities the responsible official is the Public Order and Safety Officer, in 25 percent of the municipal authorities this is a policy offer and in the other 24 percent the responsibility is assigned elsewhere. The policy plans often stipulate that various departments of municipal authorities must cooperate. This involves areas such as public order and safety, employment and income, education and youth affairs.

Interviews show that municipal authorities view the issue more broadly than just jihadism or radicalisation. As previously mentioned in Section 2.2 they also view polarisation in society as a related issue in which municipal authorities have a role to play. However, this relationship was not evident in the policy plans studied by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice.¹⁶

Half of the municipal authorities carries out specific activities

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice also asked municipal authorities whether they carry out specific activities to combat radicalisation. 50 percent stated that they carry out such activities, while 50 percent does not. Here too there is a statistically significant difference between small, medium-sized and large municipal authorities. All large municipal authorities that completed the questionnaire carry out such activities. The figure is 37 percent for the small municipal authorities, and 77 percent for the medium-sized municipal authorities.

70 percent has a form of case consultation

Although half of the municipal authorities stated that they do not carry out any specific activities to combat radicalisation, 72 percent of the municipal authorities conduct a local case consultation. Here too there is a statistically significant difference between small, medium-sized and large municipal authorities. The larger the municipal authority, the greater the proportion that conducts a local case consultation.

¹⁴ The Inspectorate unilaterally assessed differences between small, medium-sized and large municipal authorities with $\alpha = 5\%$.

¹⁵ The Inspectorate follows the division made by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Here a small municipal authority has less than 50,000 inhabitants, a medium-sized municipal authority between 50,000 and 100,000 and a large municipal authority more than 100,000.

¹⁶ The Inspectorate studied the policy plans of seven municipal authorities. These were in all cases the policy plans of the municipal authorities where the Inspectorate conducted interviews.



Of the municipal authorities that conducts a case consultation, 61 percent does this together with other municipal authorities. 39 percent does this alone. This reflects the issues also heard in interviews that small municipal authorities do not always have sufficient capacity and/or expertise to put the approach into practice.

Case consultations exist in various forms

Case consultations are not identical everywhere. The form and the participants are to a great extent determined by the information needs. In 55 percent of the municipal authorities, the consultation is held as part of the Community Safety Partnership, where various departments/bodies come together to reduce crime and other issues. In a number of municipal authorities the consultation is held in the Regional Information and Expertise Centre (RIEC). In 21 percent of the municipal authorities it is organised as a separate component. In the remaining 24 percent of the municipal authorities it is accommodated somewhere else. However, there is a clear picture as to the organisations that participate: municipal authorities, the Public Prosecution Service and the police are structural partners in the consultation in most municipal authorities. Other (groups of) organisations, such as health care authorities, the Probation Service, the Child Care and Protection Board and youth protection authorities mostly participate on an incidental or case-specific basis. In practice, this means they are invited if this will be of added value for a case.

In a number of municipal authorities or regions (in which certain municipal authorities cooperate) the case consultation does not exist in isolation. Sometimes there is also a *weegploeg* or 'weighing-up team' or an assessment meeting. In a *weegploeg* representatives of the 'local triangle', namely the police, the Public Prosecution Service and the municipal authority, discuss all issues put forward by a partner and decide how the case should be dealt with. In practice this boils down to answering the question of whether a case should be referred to the radicalisation case consultation or not. An assessment meeting is used as an assessment moment for a case. One of the involved organisations submits a case and discusses whether the approach is still on course. Any sticking points are also addressed. This assessment meeting also plays a role in policy formation: sticking points identified in cases can lead to adjustment of policy.

There are regional differences in the way that the local authorities (the local triangle) cooperate. This administrative context exerts an influence on the chosen form of consultation. In addition the concentration of expertise plays a role in this choice: municipal authorities which deal with few cases have often chosen to join forces in order to cluster sufficient expertise.

The NCTV in the case consultations

When the NCTV introduced the Action Programme in August 2014, a number municipal authorities were already operating a form of local case consultation. The NCTV was already supporting ten municipal authorities, but the case consultations had not yet been formalised. This is why in this phase the NCTV invested in setting up and advising the case consultations. To this end, four NCTV staff members were assigned to the task and ultimately provided support to 22 municipal authorities. These 'local approach advisors' also participated in the case consultations, among other things in order to input knowledge and expertise regarding the threat and to advise on action perspectives. The municipal authorities responded positively to their deployment. Over the last two years the number has risen to 12.



3.2.2 Security and social partners

As stated, other organisations also participate in the case consultation. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that the organisations take a pragmatic approach to this at the local level. Parties are invited on the basis of their knowledge and expertise with regard to the case at hand. In principle, every party can take part in this consultation as long as it brings added value and has an involvement in the case. This means that, in addition to partners from the security chain, organisations from the social domain also take part, such as the Employment and Income department of a municipal authority or a representative of the Social District Team.

Good practice: high willingness and motivation to cooperate

In the Action Programme, the NCTV has not specified which organisations should cooperate at the local level. This issue is left to the municipal authorities. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that municipal authorities provide customised solutions here. Organisations cooperate according to the need for such cooperation, meaning organisations are motivated to work together. This has a positive effect on cooperation.

Municipal authorities also work with other partners outside the framework of the case consultation. Part of the prevention policy is conducted in cooperation with other schools and social organisations.¹⁷ This cooperation did, however, require some effort to create a sense of urgency among these partners. After all, in the prevention phase a concrete threat or danger has not yet been identified.

A number of municipal authorities also utilise a network of key persons. This involves persons from communities who play a public role, albeit sometimes informal, within the community. Through these key persons municipal authorities can maintain contact with communities, firstly in order to become aware of any tensions that may be occurring and then in order to engage in dialogue when this is necessary.

3.2.3 Information sharing between organisations

In the person-specific approach various organisations cooperate in order to assess and weigh up cases and to draw up a plan of action. This is subject to the condition that sufficient information is available to the participating organisations in order to arrive at a substantiated decision.

Information sharing during the case consultation

When it comes to sharing personal data, organisations that process personal data are subject to the applicable legislation and regulations such as the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wbp), the Judicial Information and Criminal Records Act and the Police Data Act.¹⁸ Whether and under what circumstances it is permissible to

¹⁷ See for instance Measures 21, 22, 23 and 24.

¹⁸ Under Section 39f (1), Judicial Information and Criminal Records Act, the Inspectorate for Safety and Justice of the Public Prosecution Service may, insofar as this is necessary with regard to a substantial public interest (such as the interest of national security or public safety), provide data on criminal proceedings to persons and institutions for certain purposes. Under Section 20, Police Data Act, the



share personal data depends on the case in question and requires a weighing up of the situation. It depends on this weighing-up whether personal data are shared in the case consultation. On the basis of interviews the Inspectorate of Security and Justice notes that staff take varying approaches to this matter.

Weighing up whether an indication is relevant to the approach is a tricky aspect with regard to radicalisation. There are often multiple indications that, taken together, may point to a person undergoing radicalisation. One indication need not in itself be significant, but multiple indications taken together may indeed be significant. So it is important that all indications are shared in the case consultation in order to arrive at a good assessment. There is however a chance that, if only a few indications have so far been received, a party may not share a particular indication because he or she estimates that this is not necessary to the approach. After all, a single indication may not be of significance. If several parties act in the same manner, then a case may incorrectly not be flagged as radicalisation.

The Inspectorate ascertains that organisations have a strong awareness of the regulations regarding the sharing of person-specific data. At the same time they are aware of the security-related constraints for sharing this information. They try to meet both requirements as well as they can, but this creates a field of tension in the information process.

Expectations about the model agreement

The NCTV has drawn up a model agreement to clarify the requirements that municipal authorities and chain partners must meet in order to share information within the legal frameworks, such as the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wbp). At the time that the Inspectorate of Security and Justice conducted interviews the model agreement was in the finalisation phase. In some interviews the Inspectorate recorded that there were diverse expectations about what the agreement would mean in practice. Some interview partners believed that the model agreement would enable information sharing between organisations. However, the agreement does not do this: the agreement only indicates which information may be shared with which persons or institutions under which circumstances. This reflects the legal principles already in force and in addition contains a number of agreements to ensure that other parties handle the information carefully.

Information from intelligence services

The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) has the task of 'identifying and interpreting as early as possible threats, risks and international political developments that others cannot recognise and that can have major consequences for the interests of the Dutch state'.¹⁹ Terrorism is a theme where the AIVD also has a role to play: identifying, interpreting and subsequently prompting other organisations to action. The tool available to the AIVD for this task is issuing an official notice. This is 'a document with which the AIVD provides information to a recipient who is empowered, on the basis of this information, to take measures

police may in the interest of substantial public interest and as part of an alliance of the police with persons or institutions provide police data for certain purposes to these persons or institutions and under Section 18(2), Police Data Act, the police may supply structural, specifically defined police data insofar as this is necessary for promoting substantial public interest. The other involved institutions may under Section 8, Preamble and under (e) of the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wbp), process personal data if this processing is necessary for the proper execution of their public-law task or of the administrative authority to which the data are provided.

¹⁹ See www.aivd.nl.



against the person or organisation named in the notice'.²⁰ *In the context of jihadist terrorism the AIVD can thus send official notices to, for instance, the Public Prosecution Service if criminal proceedings can be instituted or to a municipal authority if this can, for instance take a passport-related measure.*

The AIVD does not supply any information that reveals the working methods and/or sources of the service, as this can endanger national security. This means that official notices may not contain the source(s) on which they are based. Furthermore, organisations share indications of radicalisation with the AIVD, which can obtain further information if there is good cause. This is subject to the limitation that the AIVD may not reveal what they do with the information for the same reasons as stated above.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains in the study that organisations that do not frequently but only occasionally receive official notices from the AIVD find it difficult to interpret such an official notice. It is viewed as problematic that action must be taken on the basis of an official notice while people do not know what the reasons are for the official notice being issued. In addition, organisations would like to know what the AIVD does with supplied information in order to understand the importance of this. If it is not known how the information is acted on, then the motivation to supply it may decrease. The Inspectorate considers it important that organisations should be aware of what the AIVD is and is not permitted to do and why this is so.

3.3 Cooperation within organisations

Besides the importance of cooperation between organisations, it is also important that the issue of radicalisation is delegated and handled properly within an organisation. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that in practice one can generally define two variants. In the first variant an organisation views radicalisation as part of its regular range of tasks and so does not set up a specific department for this theme. In the second variant organisations do indeed see radicalisation as a special area and thus assign the issue to dedicated teams.

Police

The police sees terrorism and radicalisation as an issue requiring specific expertise and has thus chosen the second variant by assigning specific staff to the task. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice conducted interviews with four police units. These four units demonstrate both similarities and differences in the way in which the theme is assigned within the unit. What all visited units had in common is the fact that one or more officers are assigned the portfolio. Differences are to be found chiefly in the place in the organisation where this officer works and the number of officers. In one unit, for instance, this task is assigned to two officers who work in the staff department of the unit. In another unit the task is assigned more locally at the district level. The most important argument for organising this at district level is the anchoring in the local approach. An important argument for organising the task more centrally is that it enables clustering of expertise.

At the National Unit the theme is assigned to the 'counterterrorism, extremism and radicalisation' portfolio (CTER). This unit is responsible for coordinating between

²⁰ See Section 36 of the Intelligence and Security Services Act (WIV).



units and for the further development of the approach. It does not provide any operational command.

Public Prosecution Service

The Action Programme has not prompted a different *modus operandi* at the Public Prosecution Service (OM). There is a Public Prosecutor for CTER in all districts, thus enabling easier contact on this specific domain between the Public Prosecution Service and other organisations. To give one example, there are frequent contacts between police investigative teams who are investigating CTER issues and the CTER officer. Furthermore, there are two national CTER officers working at the national office of the Public Prosecution Service. They are empowered to access information on which AIVD official notices are based and thus to judge whether there are sufficient grounds for criminal investigation.

The Dutch Probation Service

The Probation Service has a role to play regarding radicalisation when people are suspected or convicted of a terrorist crime. In the case of a suspicion the Probation Service advises on the penalty. In the case of a conviction the Probation Service supervises the imposed conditions.²¹ The Dutch Probation Service (RN) has put together a nationally operating team of probation officers: the TER team,²² containing probation officers from the five regions.²³ This team advises on the penalty and on how to monitor compliance with the imposed conditions.

Child Care and Protection Board

The Child Care and Protection Board (RvdK) enters the picture when juveniles are threatened in their development. This can involve juveniles who themselves radicalise or juveniles whose parents radicalise. A policy officer at the national office has this theme in his portfolio. Among other tasks, he records how many cases are involved, provides more in-depth material and working instructions on the intranet and functions as a contact point for child welfare investigators. No child welfare investigators have been specially assigned to deal with this type of cases, due to the limited number of such cases. Besides this the Child Care and Protection Board believes that the child welfare investigators are already sufficiently equipped to deal with this target group because in essence it involves the same issues as in other cases: a search for identity and/or rebelling against the established order.

Royal Netherlands Marechaussee

The primary task of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar) in the area of terrorism involves protecting the external borders, including Schiphol and Eindhoven airports. Here the KMar carries out police tasks, meaning that they safeguard public order and investigate criminal crimes. In addition the KMar is responsible for border security. Hence the KMar is responsible for detaining persons who have been flagged (internationally) and are attempting to travel out. Persons returning from conflict areas are also detained by the KMar.

The CTER theme is integrated throughout the KMar organisation. However, a special CTER team was recently set up at Schiphol. This team is linked to the CTER Public Prosecutor of the Noord Holland District Public Prosecutor's Office.

²¹ This is the case when a person receives a (partially) suspended sentence or in the case of a conditional release, for instance. The Probation Service monitors compliance with the imposed conditions.

²² TER stands for Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation.

²³ The Dutch Probation Service is divided into five regions: South, South-West, North-West, Central-North and East.



Migration Coordination

With regard to migration coordination the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) takes a coordinating role in the area of national security. A number of policy officers are responsible for this portfolio, ensure coordination in the chain and maintain contact with chain partners. In addition, a number of officials have the task of liaising with the security services. The actual implementation of the measures in the Action Programme, such as declaring verified departures with a non-EU nationality to be undesirable aliens, is the responsibility of another department.



4

Application of measures

The local case consultation reaches a joint decision about which measures are required. The actual implementation of a measure is then delegated to the organisation with the corresponding powers. The working method functions well in the local context and leads to customised interventions. Municipal authorities are familiar with most of the measures formulated in the Action Programme. This does not however apply to all measures, meaning that some are not applied when they would be useful. The most frequently applied measures are preventative in nature.

When several measures are being implemented simultaneously this may lead to undesirable mutual interference: one measure can inhibit the effect of another. Here the Inspectorate of Security and Justice notes that there are various coordination possibilities for preventing this, besides the case consultation. However, this fact is not known to all organisations.

Accountability for applied measures currently takes place in a chiefly quantitative manner. There is a broadly held wish among professionals that accountability be rendered less quantitative and more qualitative.

This chapter explains how the decision is reached to apply a measure and which organisation is charged with the application. It also describes how measures combine and sets out the accountability for applied measures.

4.1 The role of case consultation

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that the case consultation is the body where it is decided which measures need to be taken in order to prevent a person who is radicalising, or in danger of radicalising, from committing a crime. This is the bridge between recognising indications of radicalisation and subsequently applying a measure. Any organisation that suspects radicalisation can register a case for consideration by this body. When arranging the first meeting the municipal authority, or the Security House²⁴ if the case consultation will be taking place there,

²⁴ In the Netherlands, a Security House is a network of organisations who work together structurally, such as the police, the public prosecutor and health care organisations. In these Security Houses, organisations work together to combat crime and recidivism.



checks which parties are involved in the case. These are then invited to the first meeting.

During a case consultation the participants discuss the present state of affairs in the case and any existing concerns. Then they discuss the available options for intervening, they jointly weigh these up and then choose an approach. The motto here is 'customised solutions': the organisations gear the measures to the characteristics of the case. Professionals confirm that this is the strength of the integral approach.

Good practice

In Amsterdam, case managers are appointed. These are designated officers from fourteen different organisations, released for this task by their own organisation and provided with training by the municipal authority. Each case is assigned to a case manager, depending on the focus of the case in question. This manager plays a leading role in a case. He or she is the person who draws up the plan of action and determines which organisations should be involved, for instance. The case manager is also responsible for recording the progress.

The actual implementation of a measure is the responsibility of the specific organisation with corresponding powers.

4.2 Person-specific measures

The Action Programme contains a number of measures within the framework of the person-specific approach. Some of these required new legislation, such as Measure 11 ('administrative risk-reduction measures for persons travelling out to perform jihad'). Some of these involved existing measures, such as criminal prosecution which was already possible on the basis of existing definition of crimes in the Dutch Criminal Code. Finally, there are also measures not included in the Action Programme, such as the provision of care in the event of mental health problems. This section examines a number of measures that are taken in practice. These are thus not automatically measures from the Action Programme. Moreover, this list is not exhaustive.

The measures are grouped in the order in which they are usually applied. The first few measures are essentially about establishing contact with involved persons.

Social organisations

In many cases, the person alienates from society. Social organisations can play a role in helping involved persons to once again feel part of Dutch society. One example is an advocacy organisation for a cultural group or an organisation that works to help disadvantaged juveniles.

Care sector

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertained in interviews that many persons discussed in the radicalisation case consultation have mental health problems. Care is then offered to these persons, for instance in the form of treatment for the mental health disorder.



Municipal authorities

Municipal authorities have various ways of addressing and helping a person. One example is the payment or non-payment of benefits. Another example is to make contact through the Social District team. In addition, municipal authorities are responsible for the broad-based prevention policy.

Exit facility & family support centre

Measure 13: Establishment of a new Exit facility in the Netherlands.

Measure 23: Concerned citizens can count on support.

Measure 13 provides for the creation of an Exit facility that can support persons who want to distance themselves from jihadism. Measure 23 provides for, among other things, the creation of the Family Support Centre through which 'family members, friends or persons otherwise involved with radicalised, or radicalising individuals or persons travelling out are provided with support and if wished can be brought into contact with other people in the same situation'. The Exit facility and the Family Support Centre are together managed by the Fier Fryslân Foundation, which receives a corresponding grant from the Ministry of Security and Justice. Municipal authorities can call in support by the Exit facility or the Family Support Centre.

Child care and protection measures

Measure 17: In the case of probable travel which involves a minor, child protective measures are taken.

If a minor is involved, child protective measures can be taken. A family supervision order can be issued, for instance, if the healthy development of the child is endangered or the child can be taken into care. In such cases the Child Care and Projection Board is the body that submits a request to the juvenile court. If the court grants this request, the measure is implemented by a child care and protection institution.

Administrative measures

Measure 11: Administrative measures for risk reduction of jihadist travellers.

On 1 March 2017 the Temporary Administrative Counter-Terrorism Measures Bill came into effect. This law makes it possible for the Minister of Security and Justice to impose a number of measures involving the restriction of liberty in order to protect national security. These include area bans or police notification requirements.²⁵ The area ban can be enforced by means of an ankle monitor. The minister is empowered to impose these measures, but does this in consultation with the concerning municipal authority.

²⁵ See Section 2 of the Temporary Administrative Counter-Terrorism Measures Bill (*Tijdelijke wet bestuurlijke maatregelen terrorismebestrijding*).



Passport measure

The passport measure can be imposed in order to make it harder for someone to travel out. First, the municipal authority where the person resides is included in the specific register stating the person may not receive a new passport. Furthermore, the existing passport is flagged. In practice this gives the empowered authorities the task of confiscating the passport when the person uses it. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar) and customs are examples of such authorities. The person retains his identification document, meaning that he is still allowed to travel within the European Union. An international travel ban (administrative measure) forbids a person from leaving the Netherlands at all.

The police or the municipal authority requests the passport measure, while the Minister of Security and Justice imposes the measure.

Asset-freezing measure

Measure 8: Verified departees known to have joined a terrorist fighting force are placed on the national terrorism list.

If a person is on the national terrorism list this means, among other things, that their financial assets are frozen. It is also a crime to provide financial resources to persons on the national terrorism list. The implementation of this measure is the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁶ To this end the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has organised an asset-freezing consultation organ in which various organisations participate, including the Public Prosecution Service, the AIVD, the police and the NCTV.

Immigration-law measures

Measure 4: Dutch nationality will be stripped from verified departees who join terrorist militias.

Measure 5: V of a non-EU nationality are declared an undesirable alien (for the Schengen area).

Persons who have travelled out, who have joined a terrorist group and who pose a threat to national security can be stripped of their Dutch nationality (only when the person holds a second nationality). They can also be declared an undesirable alien. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) is empowered to take this action on behalf of the Minister of Security and Justice. The IND can also (once again on behalf of the minister) revoke the temporary residency status of persons who have travelled to terrorist conflict areas. These measures are intended to prevent either travel to such areas if this is thought probable or to prevent return after such travel.

²⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) creates an internationally binding obligation for UN member states to combat the funding of terrorism and to freeze the bank balances, other financial assets or other economic resources of persons and organisations engaged in terrorist activities.

UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) also imposes on states the obligation to freeze the bank balances and other financial assets of persons and organisations that are designated as being linked to Al-Qaeda by the committee of the Security Council established by Resolution 1267.



Border control

Persons flagged on the national terrorism list or declared an undesirable alien must be detained at the border. On the external borders of the country this is the responsibility of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar). In line with this, the KMar checks high-risk flights at Schiphol. This relates both to the people trying to travel out to conflict areas and to persons returning. The KMar can confiscate the passport of persons in the first category if the passport is flagged. The KMar detains the second category on the basis of suspicion of committing a crime (mostly participation in a terrorist organisation). The KMar does this under the authority of the Public Prosecution Service.

Criminal-justice intervention

Measure 1: Verified departees who join terrorist militias are subject to criminal investigation.

The Public Prosecution Service is exclusively empowered to decide to institute a criminal prosecution. One example of a criminal-justice intervention when it is suspected that a person has travelled to a terrorist combat zone is prosecution for joining a terrorist organisation. In the case of suspected participation in an organisation known for committing terrorist crimes, an order for provisional custody may be issued because this is a crime subject to a custodial sentence of 4 years or more.²⁷ The powers available to the Public Prosecution Service for criminal prosecution are set out in the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure and are the same as in other criminal cases.

Commitment to the Terrorist Ward

Measure 2: Persons suspected or convicted of terrorist crimes are, according to current regulations, committed directly to the Terrorist Ward (*Terroristen Afdeling*).

The Dutch Criminal Code specifies a number of crimes as terrorist crimes.²⁸ If someone is suspected of or convicted for such a crime he is committed to the Terrorist Wing of a prison. This is a custodial regime that is tailored to the target group and has a strong focus on security. The Netherlands currently has two prisons with a Terrorist Ward, namely the penitentiary institutions Vught and De Schie.

Probation supervision

Measure 3: The criminal justice system offers various possibilities for placing returnees under long-term supervision.

If a person is given a suspended or partially suspended sentence, the court may attach special conditions to the sentence. These may include an area ban or an obligation to remain in an area, the obligation to receive treatment and an obligation to report to the police at regular intervals. The Probation Service supervises compliance with these imposed conditions.

²⁷ Section 67 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.

²⁸ See Section 83 Dutch Criminal Code for a summary of terrorist crimes.



4.3 Familiarity and application of measures

As previously stated, municipal authorities coordinate the local approach. This means that municipal authorities must be familiar with the possible measures so that the case consultation is able to apply the most effective measure. This is why the questionnaire administered by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice asked how familiar the municipal authorities are with the measures.

Most measures are familiar

The great majority of the municipal authorities are familiar with most measures. Per measure, around 10 percent indicated unfamiliarity with the specific measure. For a number of measures this percentage is higher, namely the Exit facility (46 percent), the asset-freezing measure (37 percent) and the Centre of Expertise on Social Tension and Radicalisation (34 percent).²⁹

More measures not applied than are applied

In the questionnaire the Inspectorate of Security and Justice also asked whether measures have been applied in the municipal authority. The division between applied and not applied varies per measure, but for most measures it can be said that they are more often not applied than applied. Measures that are more often not applied than applied are cooperation with the Muslim community (Measure 21), support from educational institutions (Measure 34) and giving impetus to expertise at the implementation level (Measure 35). These are preventative measures, which are thus more often applied than repressive measures, such as the passport measure or criminal prosecution. This is also logical, because repressive measures depend on the case at hand while less immediate reasons are required for broad prevention.

Organisations do not feel any measures are missing

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice asked all organisations whether they feel that intervention possibilities are lacking. In response they indicated that no measures are lacking for intervention at case level. This means that the Action Programme meets this need.

4.4 Areas of tension

In practice it seems that applying certain measures together is hard to reconcile. Sometimes one measure can inhibit the intended effect of another measure. Below we set out the most important combinations of measures which create areas of tension.

Criminal law versus immigration law regarding verified departees

If someone is travelling out to Syria the Public Prosecution Service can institute a prosecution if they suspect a person of joining a terrorist organisation. From the perspective of national security, the person can in some cases be refused entry to the Netherlands using immigration law by declaring the person an undesirable alien. The person is then unable to enter the Netherlands and the Schengen area.

²⁹ The Action Programme contains the term 'Centre of Expertise on Social Tension and Radicalisation' (*expertcentrum maatschappelijke spanningen en radicalisatie*). The Inspectorate of Security and Justice adopted this term in the digital questionnaire. It later transpired that the centre of expertise has been renamed the Centre of Expertise on Social Stability. It is therefore possible that this percentage may in reality be higher.



However, in order to execute any imposed punishment someone must indeed be in the Netherlands. An immigration-law measure may stand in the way of a criminal prosecution.

The Public Prosecution Service and the IND consult on such cases. This essentially revolves around a complex issue, namely choosing between protecting the constitutional state through criminal prosecution on the one hand and removing the threat by refusing someone entry to the Netherlands on the other.

Asset-freezing measure

The asset-freezing measure is applied in principle to people who have travelled out. This prevents them from accessing money that will be used in their participation in terrorist crimes. The asset-freezing measure results from an international obligation: if a person is placed on the terrorism list, the state is obliged to freeze their assets.

In practice it frequently happens that 'remainers'³⁰ make use of the same assets. Although the measure is intended to inhibit the traveller, it thus also penalises the remainers who as a result can experience financial difficulties.

Exemptions to the asset-freezing measure are possible. Part of the assets may, for instance, be made available for designated expenditure such as living costs. It may also be made available to remainers so that they can still access the funds. Municipal authorities and other organisations wishing to adjust the asset-freezing measure applied to a person should place this, via the Public Prosecution Service, on the agenda of the asset-freezing consultation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that municipal authorities are frequently not aware of this possibility.

Exit facility and probation supervision

Support provided by the Exit facility is aimed at helping people renounce jihadism. This has some overlap with probation supervision, which is also employed in this context. In practice the processes can interfere with each other if they run simultaneously. The Dutch Probation Service and the Exit facility have now agreed that the Exit facility will withdraw if a probation supervision process is being carried out. However, the Probation Service can call in the Exit facility if it considers doing so to be opportune.

The Inspectorate also ascertains that the Exit facility may possibly hold information that can be of importance to the police and/or security services. However, the Exit facility states that it works with its clients on the basis of mutual trust and is not an investigative body. Hence the Exit facility does not automatically share all information that may be relevant to the police or security service. It only does this when the facility itself estimates that a security risk exists. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that it is not clear to what extent staff of the Exit facility are sufficiently equipped to weigh up this issue.

Public Prosecution Service as coordinator in criminal-justice processes

As previously stated, the municipal authority coordinates the local approach to radicalisation. However, if a criminal conviction is involved and the Probation Service is supervising, this reduces the freedom of the municipal authority to determine an

³⁰ This term refers to close family and friends of a traveller who remain in the Netherlands.



approach. This is because the court ruling must be implemented. In practice, the municipal authority and the Probation Service coordinate their efforts well, whereby the municipal authority makes an active contribution and suggests initiatives but the Public Prosecution Service has the last word because it is responsible for the execution of the court ruling.

4.5 Accountability for measures

At the level of both municipal authorities and the central government there is a need for accountability for how radicalisation is being dealt with. At the government level, the Minister of Security and Justice issues a quarterly progress report that sets out the current state of affairs for each measure in the Action Programme. At the level of municipal authorities the accountability varies per municipal authority. Some municipal authorities inform their municipal council how many persons are included in the local person-specific approach, while others do not do this.

One problematic aspect of this accountability is giving a clear account of the results. There is a tendency to provide accountability in quantitative terms, for instance the number of criminal convictions. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains a broadly held desire among professionals to make the accountability less quantitative and more qualitative. Indeed, the number of criminal convictions says little about the effectiveness of the integral approach. The kind of insight into the approach desired at the national level does not mesh well with the content of the work being conducted at decentralised levels. Hence it is currently hard to say whether involved organisations are delivering the required quality in the integral approach.

The Inspectorate notes here that, from a methodological perspective, it is very difficult to make statements about the effect of measures. It is by definition impossible to measure whether the preventative measures are the reason why no terrorist attack has been carried out by jihadists in the Netherlands.



5

Knowledge and expertise

Organisations invest in the expertise of their staff in various ways. There are many possibilities for participating in courses and training opportunities. Organisations that make such investments have expert staff who are sufficiently equipped to deal with radicalisation. One dilemma about whether to invest in training or not is estimating the need for such training. To what extent can one, without corresponding training, estimate whether radicalisation occurs frequently enough in a municipal authority to justify the investment?

Furthermore the Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that the government has limited insight into the training supplied by private service providers and thus also of the level of expertise of the staff who have attended these courses.

In order for staff to identify radicalisation and to understand an ideology it is necessary for them to be correspondingly trained. This is why the Action Programme contains various measures intended to contribute to this.

5.1 Range of courses and training opportunities

Measure 35: Give impetus to expertise at the implementation level.

Expertise, and thus also the provision of good training, is a prerequisite for a good approach to radicalisation. This is why Measure 35 in the Action Programme states, among other things, that the NCTV 'shall establish an accredited specialist training programme for staff of institutions and organisations engaged in combating jihadism'. In addition the measure states that 'first-line staff in the most-involved municipal authorities are trained to recognise jihadist radicalisation and in how to respond appropriately'.

Dutch Training Institute for the Prevention of Radicalisation

The wish to provide an accredited specialist training programme is derived from the need to guarantee a basic level of knowledge and expertise at the implementation level. However, such an accredited specialist training programme for staff of institutions and organisations involved in combating jihadism does not yet exist. The



aim is that the Dutch Training Institute for the Prevention of Radicalisation (ROR), set up by the NCTV in collaboration with the Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI), will be developed into an accredited training institute. The DJI already has its own training institute which provides courses and training opportunities in the security domain. The ROR is accommodated here and makes use of the same facilities. The NCTV has chosen this option due to practical arguments regarding facilities, but also because the DJI training institute already had the requisite experience with developing and providing training. In order to encourage attendance at the ROR training courses, the NCTV has correspondingly allocated part of the support funding.

The ROR develops training courses itself and offers these to clients, which are exclusively government organisations. The curriculum committee at the ROR must approve each course and training programme before it can be brought to market. This committee comprises experts from, among other areas, the NCTV, the academic community and the police. The clients are satisfied with the courses provided by the ROR.

The current range of courses provided by the ROR is as follows:

- Basic and advanced courses on radicalisation & jihadism.
- Training on Potentially Violent Loners (PVL).
- Four e-learning modules: right-wing extremism, Islamic radicalisation, PVL and privacy.
- Training for the mental health sector.

Currently under development:

- Training courses for imams and mosque leaders, for parents and for key figures in society.

Impetus funding

Municipal authorities can apply to the NCTV for impetus funding to help them develop and strengthen their local approach. In this application, municipal authorities must state how they aim to spend the money. This is intended to provide impetus to local policy for tackling radicalisation. Some of this funding can be earmarked for ROR training courses. A municipal authority can then indicate which training courses it wishes to book. Organisations are also free to use their own budget to attend training courses at the ROR.

Centre of Expertise for Social Stability

In addition to the ROR, the Centre of Expertise for Social Stability (ESS) has been established. This organisation provides the expertise function for the national government in the area of radicalisation and the broader field of social tensions and social stability. In addition to sharing ideas with, for instance, municipal authorities regarding current tensions, the ESS also provides training courses. While the training courses of the ROR are focused primarily on Security and Justice organisations, the training courses of the ESS are focused more on municipal authorities and social partners.



The current range of courses provided by the ESS is as follows:

- Training course 'Dealing with Extreme Ideals'.
- Learning group for a preventive approach to radicalisation.
- Workshop 'Key figures network'.
- Workshop 'Educators in action'.

School Safety Foundation

Schools play an important role in recognising and reporting radicalisation in juveniles. If schools have questions about this theme they can contact the School Safety Foundation (*Stichting School en Veiligheid, SVV*). In addition teachers can attend training courses provided by the ROR or the ESS. The SSV is currently providing training to eighteen schools.

Public-private partnerships

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that, in addition to the ROR, several private organisations are also offering courses and training opportunities in the field of radicalisation. The influence that the NCTV is able to exert on the quality of the ROR training courses via the curriculum committee does not apply to these organisations. As such, there is little insight into the content and quality of these training courses. Consequently there is also limited insight into the level of knowledge and expertise among staff who have attended courses and/or training programmes provided by private companies. Of the organisations interviewed by the Inspectorate, a number had received training from a private company. The organisations were satisfied with the training received.

5.2 Promotion of expertise

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that Security and Justice organisations ensure the expertise of their staff in various ways. Primarily, staff receive corresponding training; this can be training courses provided by the ROR or also by private consultancy firms. Interviews indicate that organisations are also positive about these latter training courses. In most cases training is provided only to the staff members who work with the target group. This is different for the police, where all the executive personnel currently receive training in the form of a three-day course.

A second method is to provide background information, instructions and such via the organisation's intranet. This involves supporting material for the staff to which only they have access.



Good practice

Besides courses and training opportunities received by the members of the TER team at the Dutch Probation Service, the organisation also ensures expertise in another way. The biweekly case consultations are regularly attended by a forensic psychologist and a theologian (not simultaneously). Probation workers can apply their expertise to specific questions, for instance concerning religion. This provides probation workers with specific and up-to-date expertise in order to deal with the target group as effectively as possible.

A third method is to include the theme in the basic training. To date only the police has done this, in order to fulfil its task of identifying threats. Here too the NCTV is working to embed the theme of radicalisation in a number of senior secondary and higher vocational education programmes focusing on youth welfare and mental health care.

When is the investment worthwhile?

Training staff costs time and money. The Inspectorate of Security and Justice ascertains that there is a dilemma in this area. On the one hand most organisations are only prepared to invest if they think that they will be confronted with the problem. On the other hand it is very difficult to recognise whether the problem actually exists if one is not trained accordingly. This is especially the case with municipal authorities. Some of these have stated to the Inspectorate of Security and Justice that radicalisation is not an issue in their area. The question is whether radicalisation is indeed not present there or whether the municipal authority cannot recognise it because they do not know where to look.

5.3 Training others

In addition to their own staff, municipal authorities also train staff of other organisations to recognise radicalisation and to offer perspectives for action. This involves civil society and social partners, for instance, who can attend a training course (for instance at the ROR), paid for by the municipal authority. In exchange they can, for instance, form part of a strategic network of key figures maintained by municipal authority.

Municipal authorities also provide information and education about this topic, for instance to mosque committees or schools. The main aim of this information is to create awareness among partners that radicalisation *may possibly* be an issue. Besides this, if they have suspicions then organisations can contact the municipal authority.



I

Bijlage Appendix Overview of measures in the Action Programme

The measures marked with a ✓ have been studied by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice itself. Measures marked with a ✗ have not been studied by the Inspectorate itself. The measure is either international in nature and thus falls outside the Inspectorate's authority or is being studied by another organisation. The Inspectorate has however included these findings in the inspection report.

Risk-reduction for persons travelling out to perform jihad		
1.	Verified departees who join terrorist militias are subject to criminal investigation.	✓
2.	Persons suspected or convicted of terrorist crimes are, according to current regulations, committed directly to the Terrorist Ward (<i>Terroristen Afdeling</i>).	✓
3.	The criminal justice system offers various possibilities for placing returnees under long-term supervision.	✓
4.	Verified departees who have joined a terrorist fighting force are stripped of Dutch nationality.	✓
5.	Verified departees of a non-EU nationality are declared an undesirable alien (for the Schengen area).	✓
6.	Verified departees with one or more nationalities who join a terrorist fighting force are reported to the authorities of those countries (of their non-Dutch nationality).	✓
7.	The Dutch travel documents of departees who are suspected on reasonable grounds of joining a terrorist fighting force are flagged for cancellation or refusal.	✓
8.	Verified departees known to have joined a terrorist fighting force are placed on the national terrorism list.	✓
9.	Verified departees are immediately registered as residents in the Persons Database (BRP) and any benefits, financial allowances and student grants are terminated. Where necessary, laws will be amended in line with this measure.	✓
10.	It is made more difficult for persons of malicious intent to obtain potential means of attack.	✗



11.	Administrative measures for risk reduction of jihadist travellers.	✓
12.	Consular assistance by Dutch embassies in bordering countries.	✗
13.	Establishment of a new Exit facility in the Netherlands.	✓

Interventions for persons travelling out

14.	If there is reasonable suspicion that a person intends to travel out, penal action is conducted.	✓
15.	The travel documents of persons who are suspected on reasonable grounds of travelling out are flagged for cancellation or refusal (including identity cards).	✓
16.	In the case of probable travel the person's immediate circle is warned.	✓
17.	In the case of probable travel which involves a minor, child protective measures are taken.	✓

Dealing with disseminators and recruiters

18.	Recruitment for the armed struggle leads to a criminal law intervention.	✓
19.	Criminal law intervention in case of hate speech and inciting violence in an extremist context is prioritised.	✓
20.	The activities of facilitators and disseminators of jihadist propaganda are disrupted.	✓

Combating radicalisation

21.	Cooperation with the Muslim community.	✗
22.	Strengthening existing networks of local and national key figures.	✗
23.	Concerned citizens can count on support.	✗
24.	Support for educational institutions.	✗
25.	Establishment of the Expert Centre on... on Social Tension and Radicalisation.	✓
26.	Direct action aimed at radicalising juveniles in local risk areas.	✓
27.	Mobilisation of societal opposition and enhancing resilience against radicalisation and tensions.	✗
28.	Social debate about the boundaries of the constitutional state.	✗



Social media and internet		
29.	Combating the dissemination of radicalising, hatred-inciting and violent jihadist content.	✓
Information exchange and cooperation		
<i>Local</i>		
30.	The cabinet supports the local approach in prioritised areas.	✓
31.	Continuation of collaboration between national government and involved municipal authorities.	✓
<i>National</i>		
32.	Strengthening coordination of implementation of measures.	✓
33.	Prioritising the financial tackling of jihadists.	✓
34.	Improving detection of jihadist travel movements.	✓
35.	Increasing expertise in operational implementation.	✓
<i>International</i>		
36.	Intensification of international cooperation and approach regarding jihadist travelers.	✗
37.	Optimisation of existing detection means.	✗
38.	Enhancing proactive information-sharing.	✗



II

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III

Bijlage Appendix Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
AIVD	General Intelligence and Security Service (<i>Algemene Inlichtingen- and Veiligheidsdienst</i>)
CBS	Statistics Netherlands (<i>Centraal Bureau voor the Statistiek</i>)
CTER	Counterterrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation
DJI	Custodial Institutions Agency (<i>Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen</i>)
DTN	National Terrorist Threat Assessment (<i>Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland</i>)
ESS	Centre of Expertise for Social Stability (<i>Expertise Unit Sociale Stabiliteit</i>)
EU	European Union
IS	Islamic State
IND	Immigration and Naturalisation Service (<i>Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst</i>)
KMar	Royal Dutch Marechaussee (<i>Koninklijke Marechaussee</i>)
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6. Also known as Secret Intelligence Service
NCTV	National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (<i>Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding and Veiligheid</i>)
PVL	Potentially Violent Loners
RIEC	Regional Information and Expertise Centre (<i>Regionaal Informatie- en expertisecentrum</i>)
RMO	Council for Social Development (<i>Raad voor Maatschappelijke</i>

*Ontwikkeling)*

RN	Dutch Probation Service (<i>Reclassering Nederland</i>)
ROR	Dutch Training Institute for the Prevention of Radicalisation (<i>Rijksopleidingsinstituut voor het tegengaan van Radicalisatie</i>)
RvdK	Child Care and Protection Board (<i>Raad voor de Kinderbescherming</i>)
SSV	School Safety Foundation (<i>Stichting School en Veiligheid</i>)
TER	Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation
UN SC	United Nations Security Council
WBP	Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (<i>Wet bescherming personsgegevens</i>)
WIV	Intelligence and Security Services Act (<i>Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten</i>)



The Inspectorate of Security and Justice's mission

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice monitors the security and justice domain for society, the parties under its supervision, and the political arena and the parties with administrative responsibilities, to provide insight into the quality of the performance of tasks and compliance with the rules and norms, to signal risks and to encourage improvement within organisations.

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice therefore contributes to a safe and just society.

Published by:

The Inspectorate of Security and Justice
Ministry of Security and Justice
147 Turfmarkt | 2511 DP The Hague
PO Box 20301 | 2500 EH The Hague
www.inspectievenj.nl/english
September 2017

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